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DAY-CARE REGULATION: LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES
Erica B. Grubb
I. INTRODUCTION
Child day-care services in the United States have always been
subject to government regulation. However, regulatory efforts have
been far from perfect. They have been hampered by under-funded
regulatory agencies, poorly drafted statutes, confusing overlaps be-
tween federal and state requirements, and a lack of understanding by
day-care consumers and providers of the scope of regulation.
During the past year, two widely-publicized controversies di-
rected public attention to regulatory issues that have troubled the
day-care community for years. One controversy involved child abuse
in day-care centers and generated support for increased regulation of
day-care services.' The other involved efforts by profit-making day-
care entities to exempt themselves from regulation, or at least to dis-
tinguish themselves from nonprofit and publicly-funded day care
providers.'
While both controversies concern sensitive aspects of day-care
delivery, they represent only two small facets of the overall scheme of
day-care regulation.' The purpose of this article is to examine the
0 1985 by Erica B. Grubb, J.D., Harvard University, 1979; Associate, Morrison &
Foerster, San Francisco.
1. See, e.g., Lindsey, Increased Demand for Day Care Prompts a Debate on Regula-
tion: Allegations of Child Abuse Are Cited in Call for Federal Intervention and Tighter
Standards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1; see also Bennetts, Parents Find A Wide
Variety of Day Care Quality in U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Collins, Experts
Debate Impact of Day Care on Children and on Society, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1984, at 12, col.
1.
2. In Ohio, a group of proprietary day-care centers enjoined enforcement of licensing
standards that had been recently issued by the state Dep't of Public Welfare. Samkel, Inc. v.
Creasy, 7 Ohio St. 3d 17, 455 N.E.2d 493 (S. Ct. Ohio 1983). The court held that state law
authorized such rules for nonprofit and publicly-funded centers, but not for full-time proprie-
tary ones.
3. The actual incidence of child abuse by day-care providers is low. See generally H.
BLANK, ISSUES To CONSIDER IN DEVELOPING LEGISLATION CONCERNING BACKGROUND
CHECKS FOR CHILD CARE PROVIDERS AS WELL AS OTHER EQUALLY IMPORTANT INITIA-
TIVES To HELP IMPROVE FAMILY ACCESS To QUALITY CHILD CARE, 1985 (available from
Children's Defense Fund, 1520 New Hampshire Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036). Moreover,
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overall day-care scheme, in order to identify regulations that are ef-
fective and consistent with legal requirements. Thus, in addition to
addressing the two regulatory controversies mentioned above, the ar-
ticle will analyze other legal and policy issues that currently confront
public officials and day-care advocates.
These issues include administrative law questions such as
whether the government has properly delegated its authority to an
executive agency;" and constitutional law questions such as whether
the regulatory mechanism meets the constitutional requirements of
due process, equal protection, and reasonable searches and seizures.
Other issues involve the need for uniform federal day-care stan-
dards;5 the dwindling supply of money and manpower to enforce
minimum standards of care;6 and the steps to be taken by states as
they modify traditional regulatory schemes.'
Surprisingly, legal commentaries have virtually ignored these is-
sues.' Legislative staffers seeking model statutes or regulatory provi-
sions have found little help in the law review literature and other
current publications.' This article is designed to begin filling that
New York, Ohio, and Virginia appear to be the only states in which proprietary centers have
undertaken litigation or legislative advocacy to distinguish themselves from nonprofit centers.
Telephone interviews with Glenda Pleasants, Virginia Division for Children, and New York
attorney Sidney Gittelman (July 18, 1984).
4. Samkel, Inc. v. Creasy, 7 Ohio St. 3d 17, 455 N.E.2d 493 (S. Ct. Ohio, 1983) (this
case turned on this issue).
5. See generally Collins, Child Care and the States: The Comparative Licensing Study,
July 1983 YOUNG CHILDREN 3. See also infra, § II.C.2 of this article.
6. See Lindsey, supra note 1.
7. Some states have recently undertaken to modify their regulatory schemes, but many
legal and policy questions remain. For example, Virginia's effort during the 1970's to upgrade
licensing and to issue more stringent regulations prompted church-based facilities to press for a
statutory religious exemption. That exemption, now codified at VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3 (1980)
is the subject of pending litigation. See Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard, 480 F.
Supp. 636 (E.D. Va. 1979), vacated and remanded, 728 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984). See also
C. SANGER, DAY CARE LICENSING AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: AN OVERVIEW FOR PROV-
IDERS (1985).
8. Social welfare commentators and academics involved in early childhood education
have decried the scarcity of published work on licensing concepts. See, e.g., G. MORGAN, REG-
UIATION OF EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS 4 (1973). "The subject is superficially dealt with
at best, except in a handful of pamphlets and a few conferences. Apparently and surprisingly,
professionals in the field seem unwilling to think about licensing and regulation in any depth."
9. The only legal writing on the subject is Paulsen, The Licensing of Child-Care Facili-
ties-A Look At The Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1968). The literature in nonlegal publications
includes: BINDER & CLASS, THE NATURE OF WELFARE LICENSING LAWS (Nov. 1957);
Binder & Class, Regulatory Standards for Welfare Services, 1985 SOCIAL CASEWORK; Binder
& Class, Maintenance of Regulatory Standards for Welfare Services, 1958 SOCIAL
CASEWORK; N. CI.ASS, LICENSING OF CHILD CARE FACILITES BY STATE WELFARE DE-
PARTMENTS: A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT (1968) [hereinafter cited as LICENSING OF CHILD
CARE]; G. MORGAN, REGULATION OF EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS (1973) [hereinafter
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gap.
Section II will present a history of child-care regulation in this
country, to provide a context for the legal and policy issues now con-
fronting regulatory officials. Section III will describe the types of
child-care services currently available to parents, and will provide
factual and statistical information about their operations, utilization,
and financing. Section IV will analyze the legal doctrines from ad-
ministrative and constitutional law that undergird all regulatory
schemes. Section IV will then apply these doctrines to the specific
practical problems of child-care regulation, and the open issues con-
fronting reform-minded state officials.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF REGULATION
Regulation of day care is primarily a function of the states and
it would be simpler if this article did not need to focus on anything
beyond state regulatory efforts. However, our country's political phi-
losophy of "cooperative federalism" makes the inquiry more
complicated.
On several occasions during this century, the federal govern-
ment has responded by subsidizing children's services, including day-
care services. The federal subsidies have often had strings attached,
some of which intertwined with existing state regulatory efforts and
others of which added new levels of regulation. All of them influ-
enced the way state officials handled their duties.1" During the nine-
teenth century, however, there was no federal activity, thus the fol-
lowing discussion will deal only with state regulatory efforts.
A. Pre-Twentieth Century
Day-care licensing-the most common regulatory approach of
state departments of health or public welfare-is a relatively recent
development.1" It grew out of foster care licensing, which itself came
into being in the latter part of the nineteenth century.' While foster
cited as REGULATION OF PROGRAMS]; G. MORGAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL DAY CARE
STANDARDS (Wheelock College) 1976 [hereinafter cited as LEGAL ASPECTS]; H.E.W. POLICY
ISSUES IN DAY CARE: SUMMARIES OF 21 PAPERS (1977) [hereinafter cited as HEW PAPERS].
10. During some periods, the federal role was minimal. During others, it almost
eclisped state regulatory activity. This historical discussion will chart the developments at both
state and federal levels.
11. Costin, Keyserling, Pierce, & Wadlington, The Challenge of Child Day Care Needs
And Improved Federal And State Approaches To Day Care Standard Setting And Enforce-
ment, HEW PAPERS, supra note 9, at 34.
12. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 56-60.
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care and child day care are intrinsically very different,13 they share
the same regulatory origins. Both date back to the "poor laws"
adopted by American Colonists."'
Poor laws addressed the problem of how to deal with vagrant,
orphaned, abandoned, or delinquent children." The children could
be indentured to master craftsmen for care and instruction in a trade.
They could be placed in "almshouses" along with adult beggars,
prostitutes, and criminals. Or they could be assigned to orphan asy-
lums operated by public or charitable organizations. 6 While inden-
ture and apprenticeship did not persist far into the nineteenth cen-
tury, the foundling homes and almshouses did, and the children
placed in them did not fare well.1" Many died, and scandals over the
abuse of institutionalized children led to public support for stronger
government controls.18
States adopted various forms of control during the second half of
the nineteenth century. They established public "children's aid socie-
ties;" they created state boards of charity; and they attached strings
to public subsidies of private child-care agencies. 9 A brief look at
these efforts will confirm their role as precursors to actual licensing
legislation.
1. Children's Aid Societies
The first children's aid society opened in New York in 1853. It
sent thousands of homeless children from the streets of New York to
families of farmers, craftsmen, and manufacturers in Western states.
Despite some success as the country's first foster care placement
agency, the New York society did have weaknesses:
Some of the children were placed in unsuitable homes and were
13. Regulators need to give "greater weight ...to parental responsibility in day care
and Ishould have] a general reluctance to intervene in arrangements parents make privately for
the part-time care of their children. HEW PAPERS, supra note 11, at 34.
14. Id. See also S. Phadke, Licensing of Child Care in California: 1911-1961 Ph.D.
Dissertation, U.S.C. School of Social Work (1963) LEGAL ASPECTS, supra at 7-12; P. JOFFEE
& E. KI.IBANOFF, History of State Regulation of Day Care Services Prior to 1968 1977; E.
KENDAI. & L. WALKER, DAY CARE LICENSING: THE ERODING REGULATIONS (Peabody
College, Vanderbilt University 1982).
15. S. Phadke, supra note 14, at 9. See also W.N. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, BROKEN
PROMISES: How AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 15-17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as BRO-
KEN PROMISES].
16. Id.
17. H. THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD 19-26 (1930).
18. LEGAL. AsPECTs, supra note 9, at 19.
19. S. Phadke, supra note 14, at 10.
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ill-treated and exploited. No adequate follow-up or supervision
of the foster homes was provided. A strong public reaction to
unsupervised placement of children led to recognition of the
need for state regulation of child-caring agencies.20
2. State Boards of Charity
Ten years after the first children's aid society opened, a differ-
ent method of supervision was enacted in Massachusetts. The "state
board of charities"2 was a lay group of prominent citizens appointed
by the Governor to inspect and report on facilities that cared for
dependent children. Nine other states established similar boards by
1873. While these boards did not have licensing power themselves,
their reports contributed significantly to a climate favoring increased
regulation.2 2
3. State-Subsidized Institutions
The institutions caring for dependent children were not necessa-
rily public. Many were private charities of family homes that re-
ceived subsidies from state or local governments, but were privately
supported."3 Nonetheless, as more and more states began granting
such subsidies-all but four did so by 1901- taxpayers demanded
accountability and equitable use of those public funds. 2 4 Some states,
including Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana,
responded by enacting licensing laws.2" Others required subsidized
agencies to disclose their admission and discharge policies, and to
allow visitation and inspection by government officials. 2' While these
20. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 19.
21. Id.
22. Acting on reports by boards of charities, Massachusetts prohibited detention of poor
children in almshouses in 1879, and New York authorized county superintendents to remove
children from institutions if they found the care to be unsatisfactory. See LICENSING OF CHILD
CARE, supra note 9.
23. See generally cases cited supra in note 14; see also A. Johnson, Public Policy And
Private Charities (Univ. of Chicago) 1931.
24. A. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17-51.
25. The first was Pennsylvania. Its 1885 law made it a misdemeanor to "engage in the
business of receiving, boarding, or keeping" children under the age of three without first ob-
taining a license from the mayor or justice of the peace. Massachusetts' 1892 law required
anyone boarding two or more infants under two years of age to get a license from the State
Board of Lunacy and Charity. Illinois' 1899 statute required that the State Board of Commis-
sioners of Public Charity approve the articles of incorporation of any organization caring for
dependent children. Ohio and Indiana passed similar laws in 1908 and 1909, respectively. S.
Phadke, supra note 14, at 12; LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 57-58.
26. A. Johnson, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL WORK 83-102 (1959).
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early laws were weak and poorly enforced, "as the quality of child
care in the voluntary sector improved, the states could begin to re-
quire quality beyond the mere elimination of deaths and blatant
abuse."27
The early laws focused on institutions and boarding homes
where children lived. They did not contemplate regulation of facili-
ties providing day care, partly because such facilities were rare and
partly because the justification for state oversight was that children
in foster care did not have parents to monitor their care and well-
being. The children were "dependent," and the government needed
to stand in loco parentis. However, some of the early licensing laws
could be read to encompass regulation of day care. Well into the
twentieth century, most state licensing laws applied the same stan-
dards to residential institutions and day care facilities.28
B. Early Twentieth Century Regulatory Activity
1. The State Role
State regulation of all forms of private enterprise increased dra-
matically during the progressive era of the 1890's and the early
twentieth century.2" Policymakers continued to impose accountability
measures on agencies caring for dependent children. But they also
recognized that "[Rleformatories, orphanages, and other ex-
trafamilial institutions for deviant and dependent children could not
replicate families, and that the state should seek reforms to support
children within their families rather than institutionalizing
children." 30
This two-pronged public policy-one prong calling for govern-
ment efforts to "shore up the family," and the other calling for in-
creased government responsibility for children through public insti-
tutions-was the hallmark of a "child welfare" movement just
developing in the United States. By 1909, the movement had
achieved enough influence to sponsor an historic Conference on the
Care of Dependent Children." The conference, and the child wel-
27. REGULATION OF PROGRAMS supra, note 9.
28. See generally M. Paulsen, supra note 9.
29. See generally BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 15, at 19-28; R. HOFSTADTER, THE
AGE OF REFORM at 60-82 (1955).
30. BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 15, at 24.
31. This was the precursor of the decennial White House Conference on Children.
Meeting every decade since 1909, the conferences have been a forum for advocates and profes-
sionals to establish agendas for children. Unfortunately, the first conference was the only one
to have any real effect on government policy towards children. The others primarily generated
[Vol. 25
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fare movement that sponsored it, sought long-term federal involve-
ment in children's services.
2. The Federal Role
In 1912, Congress established the United States Children's Bu-
reau as an ongoing federal presence to monitor the well-being of
children. The Bureau influenced numerous programs enacted during
the progressive era. These included the mother's pensions program,
which gave government funds to indigent mothers so that they could
stay at home rather than seek employment; juvenile probation pro-
grams which allowed delinquent children to remain with their fami-
lies rather than in institutions; and the first "day-care centers" for
poor women who had to work but wanted to keep custody of their
children. 82
Ironically, the federal programs that were designed to shore up
the family actually increased the overall scope of public responsibil-
ity for the children. This result was consistent with the enabling leg-
islation of the Children's Burean, which spoke in terms of bettering
the condition of all children,3 3 but it clashed with 1909 Conference
rhetoric about private responsibility and the importance of family.
The tension between public and private responsibility for children
has persisted throughout this century, and has played a role in every
effort to regulate day care since the progressive era.34
C. The 1920's
1. The State Role
During this period, state regulatory activity in child care
predominated over direct federal involvement. However, the feder-
ally established Children's Bureau continued to grow, and along
with a companion entity in the private, nonprofit sector (the Child
rhetoric. See BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 15, at 111. See also LICENSING OF CHILD CARE,
supra note 9, at 58.
32. BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 15, at 25. The Children's Bureau also played an
active role in developing child care licensing programs, devising actual standards of care, and
establishing Children's Code Commissions (also known as Child Welfare Committees) in
many states. See citations cited supra in note 14.
33. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 21.
34. "The real legacy of the progressive era ... was the reaffirmation of the two com-
peting conceptions of responsibility for children which had been tentatively formulated in the
nineteenth century. The uneasy coexistence of public responsibility with an ideology of private
responsibility provided the setting for the subsequent expressions of family "crisis." BROKEN
PROMISES, supra note 15, at 27; see also C. JOFFEE, FRIENDLY INTRUDERS 3 (1977).
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Welfare League of America), the Bureau helped many states develop
licensing laws and "standards of care" for all agencies serving
children.
With the guidance of the Children's Bureau, state regulation of
children's services burgeoned during this period. By the end of the
1920's, most states had passed some form of child-care regulation.
85
Several aspects of these early laws and standards are worthy of note.
First, the laws still combined day care and foster care into the
same licensing scheme; varying standards for different types of care
came much later.36 Second, the "standards of care" were universally
perceived as "goals" toward which licensed agencies would strive,
rather than legal requirements for licensing."7 The Child Welfare
League of America, which led the movement to formulate such stan-
dards, reaffirmed this perception. 8 Third, even the licensing laws,
which were mandatory
often tended to be weak and impractical. Licensing agencies did
not fully understand their responsibility and did not seem to
know how to use either legal counsel or the courts to clearly
define their powers. Most important, licensing staffs were gen-
erally too small to implement the law . . .
Finally, the regulatory efforts were not directed towards a strand of
the child-care movement that began to evolve during the 1920's. This
was the nursery school movement, which catered to middle-class
children and stressed developmental enrichment and cognitive
growth. Its providers and consumers distinguished themselves from
the welfare-related programs that catered to low-income families and
stressed custodial care for children of working mothers.' °
35. LEGAL ASPECTS. supra note 9, at 22-3.
36. Id. See also LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 59; P. JOFFEE & L.
KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at 3.
37. Reasons for the "advisory" nature of standards included: (1) reticence on the part of
regulatory agencies to take an adversary stance with charitable institutions providing care; (2)
reluctance to impose secular restraints on church-provided services; (3) the assumption that the
state agency subsidizing the services would use its clout (and purse strings) to enforce high
standards; (4) a passive approach on the part of the social workers staffing the licensing agen-
cies; (5) cutbacks in subsidies during the Depression. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 22-23.
38. As recently as 1969, the League prefaced its publication of day-care standards with
this caveat: "These standards are intended to be goals for continuous improvement of services
to children. They are not the criteria for accreditation. ... CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR DAY CARE SERVICES (1969).
39. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 59.
40. Nursery school people regarded day nurseries with contempt: the day nur-
series suffered the disadvantages of the stigma of inadequate resources, a clien-
tele of the 'undeserving poor:' and social welfare goals rather than the more
[Vol. 25
DAY-CARE REGULATION
Nonetheless, these laws represented the beginning of broad-
based state commitments to systematically regulated child day care.
During the 1920's, the federal contribution to this development re-
mained advisory and consultative. The pendulum swung toward ex-
tensive federal involvement in children's services in the next two de-
cades, however. State regulatory efforts faded into the background as
the United States government grappled with two national crises.
D. The Great Depression of the 1930's
1. The Predominant Federal Role in Child Care
The federal government pumped huge sums of money into the
desperate economy of the 1930's, much of which was used to subsi-
dize new services for children. For example, the Federal Emergency
Relief Act of 1933 provided welfare payments to all needy, unem-
ployed persons and/or their dependents."' The Works Progress Ad-
ministration (WPA) supported nursery schools during the depres-
sion, so that parents of young children could work in WPA
projects.42 And the Social Security Act of 1935'" fostered the devel-
opment of numerous child welfare services by providing new grant-
in-aid funds to the states.
2. The State Role During the 1930's
The federal programs mentioned above were designed primarily
to enable adults to work. They did, however, have one significant
effect on state regulatory efforts. Most of the programs exemplified
cooperative federalism by providing grants-in-aid to states. State
agencies disbursed the money to eligible citizens according to federal
guidelines. This enabled state agencies to hire additional personnel
respectable efforts to educate young children. Even though nursery schools were
never widespread, they provided a strong institutional image of what the educa-
tion of young children ought to be, an image significantly different from that
provided by day nurseries.
BROKE N PROMISES, supra note 15, at 212. See generally M. 0. STEINFELS, WHO'S MINDING
THE CHILDREN: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF DAY CARE IN AMERICA (1973); S. Roth-
man, Other People's Children: The Day Care Experience in America, 30 THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST 11-27 (1973).
41. Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, PUB. L. 73-13, 48 Stat. 55 (May 12, 1933).
42. LEGAL. ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 23-4. The Works Progress Administration was
established by Executive Order 7034 on May 6, 1935. It was renamed the Works Project
Administration by Reorganization Plan 306, effective July 1, 1939, and liquidated by the
Presidential Letter dated December 4, 1942.
43. Pub. L. 74-271, Titles IV & V, 49 Stat. 627 (Aug. 14, 1935).
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to carry out all child welfare services, including licensing. 4 Conse-
quently, the amount of day-care services available increased along
with the number of its regulators.
E. World War II and the Postwar Era: More Federal Interven-
tion and then the Pendulum Swings Back
1. The Federal Role During World War I
The Lanham Act,46 passed during World War II in order to
encourage women to work in the war effort, infused additional fed-
eral funds into day-care services.' The act authorized fifty percent
federal matching funds for day care centers. As a result, during
World War II, over one million children attended programs subsi-
dized through the Lanham Act.
This period saw little or no state regulation of child day care,
even in states with strong licensing laws. Aggressive regulation
would have "inhibited the massive expansion of day care which was
seen as in the national interest at that time."' 7
2. The Increased State Role After the War
Lanham Act funds were withdrawn after the war, in accor-
dance with prior congressional commitments. Congress had allotted
Lanham Act funds "solely as a war emergency measure in order to
facilitate the employment of women needed in the war industries.
We are not subsidizing an expanded educational program nor a fed-
eral welfare program."' 8 During the years immediately following
World War II, the federal government joined private industry in ex-
horting women to return home to raise their families."9
However, women continued to work outside the home at an
ever-increasing rate."° In order to meet the needs of working parents,
44. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE FACILITIES, supra note 9, at 59.
45. Pub. L. 77-137, Title II, § 201, 55 Stat. 361 (June 28, 1941).
46. See generally H. Dratch, The Politics of Child Care in the 1940's, 38 SCIENCE
AND SOCIETY 167 (1974); R. Takanishi, Federal Involvement in Early Education (1933-
1973): The Need For Historical Perspectives, reprinted in CURRENT Topics IN EARLY
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 146-50 (L.G. Katz, ed. 1977).
47. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 24.
48. War-Area Child Care Act of 1943: Hearings on Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 1943, at 34-5 (testimony of Florence Kerr).
49. R. Takanishi, supra note 46, at 148, 155; Dratch, supra note 46, at 186-192, 201;
Grubb & Lazerson, Child Care, Government Financing, and the Public Schools: Lessons
From the California Children's Centers, 86 SCHOOL REVIEW 5, 13 (1977).
50. GREENMAN, PERSPECrIVES ON QUALITY DAY CARE, MAKING DAY CARE BET-
TER 7 (1984).
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private day-care facilities expanded in number, 1 and state regula-
tory efforts expanded to monitor the growing day-care industry.
After World War II the number of states with specific day-care
licensing laws rather than general laws regulating foster care and
implicitly subsuming day care dramatically increased. Only nine
states had passed such laws in 1944; by 1957 the number had grown
to thirty-nine. 2 Of perhaps greater interest than the number of
states with such laws is the type of day-care facility that the states
were regulating. Fifteen states required licensing for proprietary
centers only. Throughout the country, proprietary centers repre-
sented a higher percentage of licensed facilities than publicly-funded
or nonprofit ones.58
Regulation of day-care facilities continued to be the province of
state agencies that were successors to the nineteenth century Board of
Charities: i.e., Departments of Welfare, or Health and Welfare, or
simply Health. 5" These state agencies had responsibility for monitor-
ing private facilities as well as those receiving public subsidies. Dur-
ing the period after World War II, state agencies exercised that re-
sponsibility without any significant protest from the proprietary
centers.
These proprietary centers still did not include part-time nursery
schools. Such schools continued to cater to families with nonworking
mothers, and continued to be distinguished for regulatory purposes
from full-day programs serving the children of working parents.55
Nevertheless, during the 1950's, some of the cognitive and develop-
mental goals of the nursery school movement began to filter into day-
care regulation. This occurred because state agencies started collabo-
rating with child advocacy groups, professional organizations, and
concerned individuals in setting day-care standards. Such
collaboration
played a key role in the abilility of states to develop and begin
to enforce standards as well as to obtain legislative appropria-
tions. Consensus could not always be reached on the definition
of "quality care" or on minimal licensing standards, but, in
general, a spirit of cooperation between state and private agen-
51. The number of day-care facilities of all types increased dramatically during the
1950's. In 1951, there were about 1,500 licensed day care centers; in 1964, there were 6,300.
Id. at 8.
52. P. JOFFE" & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at 3-4.
53. Id. at 5-6.
54. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE FACILITIES, supra note 9, at 59.
55. See authorities cited supra note 40.
1985]
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.cies continued uninterrupted through the late 1960's within the
states.56
F. The Great Society Programs of the 1960's
1. New Federal/State Collaboration
During the 1960's, the federal government renewed support for
child welfare programs in ways that harkened back to the 1930's.
Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1962 authorized $10 mil-
lion of federal funding for day care under the Child Welfare Services
Program.5 7 This funding, appropriated under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, was available to all children in need, though its pri-
mary beneficiaries were recipients of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC).58 The 1962 amendments ushered in a new
phase of federal involvement with day care regulation, when Con-
gress tied the receipt of Title IV funds to a facility's compliance with
state licensing codes.59 As a consequence, states serving as conduits
for the new federal funds began taking a closer look at their licensing
schemes, with an eye toward strengthening and centralizing their
regulatory efforts.6
Other federal activities encouraged states to upgrade their li-
censing laws. The Children's Bureau, by then part of the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
funded a "Centennial Conference on the Regulation of Child Care
Facilities." 1 With assistance from child development specialists and
new child welfare organizations, the Children's Bureau began advo-
cating cognitive growth and other indicia of "quality" as essential
components of day-care programs. 2 This Children's Bureau worked
56. P. JOFFEE & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at 6-7. See also Takanishi, supra note
47, at 152-54.
57. PUBLIC WELFARE AMENDMENTS OF 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, Title I, § 104(a)(4),
(c)(2), 76 Stat. 185, 186 (codified as amended at 42 USC § 601 (1982)). For legislative history
and purpose of the Act see 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (76 Stat.) 1943.
58. In order to emphasize "services to families," the name of the program was changed
from "Aid to Dependent Children" to "Aid & Services To Needy Families With Children."
act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 185. See also P. JOFFEE & E.
KLIBANOFF supra note 14, at 8.
59. ACT OF JULY 25, 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, § 102(c)(2), 76 Stat. 183, 184 See also
LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 30.
60. See also P. JOFFEE & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at 8-9.
61. One of the papers read at this conference, held in Chicago in 1967, was prepared by
Monrad Paulsen-then Dean of the University of Virginia School of Law. Dean Paulsen later
revised and published this paper as the law review article cited supra note 9.
62. The Child Welfare League of America was no longer the only ally of the Children's
Bureau involved in policy-making efforts. New organizations include the National Association
for the Education of Young Children, the Association for Childhood Education International,
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closely with state licensing agencies, encouraging them to emphasize
"quality" in day care as well as compliance with minimum health
and safety requirements.
The Children's Bureau and child welfare advocates also influ-
enced other Great Society programs enacted by Congress. Their in-
fluence could be seen in the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, 3
which authorized grants for "developmental" day care under Head-
start and other community action programs; and the 1968 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act,64 which made federal matching
grants for "family and child welfare" services available to the states.
These programs had a broader purpose than their analogs from
the 1930's. In both eras the federal government sought to help needy
Americans find work. But during the 1960's, lawmakers also recog-
nized the needs of the children of working parents. If federal dollars
were going to be used to purchase day-care services for those chil-
dren, then the federal government wanted to guarantee that 1) the
services met the highest standards of quality, and 2) state agencies
receiving federal dollars to purchase those services thoroughly moni-
tored and regulated them.
2. The Federal-State Collaboration Gone Awry
Unfortunately, the federal government's new money was accom-
panied by mixed signals about what "high quality" meant, and how
the states were supposed to monitor it. HEW imposed one set of
regulations on all the state agencies receiving funds under the Social
Security Act, 65 but HEW was not the only federal agency disbursing
money for day care. The Departments of Labor, Agriculture, De-
fense, Housing and Urban Development, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs also funded day-care services.6" These agencies acted under
and the Day Care and Child Development Council of America. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note
9, at 26-28.
63. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2701 (1982)).
64. SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, § 201(a)(1), 81 Stat.
821, 877-80 (1968) (codified at 42 USC § 602 (1982)) For legislative history and purpose of
the Act, see 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 81 Stat., at 2834.
65. HEW provided matching funds to a single agency in each state -usually the health
and/or welfare department. The "single state agency," as it came to be known in regulatory
parlance, was responsible for purchasing day-care services from public or private facilities, and
for ensuring that those facilities complied with state licensing codes and HEW regulations. P.
JOFFEE & E. KLIBANOFF supra note 14, at 8. See also HEW PAPERS, supra note 9, at 34.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
THI: FEDERAL INTERAGENCY DAY CARE REQUIREMENTS (FIDCR): REPORT OF FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 135 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
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different congressional authorizations and appropriations, and until
1968, each had its own regulations and procedures. Subsidized day-
care providers were held to different standards depending on which
federal agency was the source of their funding.
In 1968, HEW devised a common set of standards that it
sought to have adopted by all federal agencies involved in funding
day-care programs. 67 These standards were promulgated as the Fed-
eral Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR). They provided
that federally funded day-care services must meet state licensing reg-
ulations as well as new federal standards on adult-child ratios, group
size limits, environmental and safety considerations, social services,
and health and nutrition.6" For reasons that will be discussed in the
next section, this effort at federal standard-setting was not a success.
G. The 1970's and 1980's: Dismantling the Great Society
Although the FIDCR were modified in 1975"' and incorporated
into Title XX of the Social Security Act,70 by the mid-1970's the
federal government's commitment to day care was waning. President
Nixon's 1971 veto of the Comprehensive Preschool Education and
Child Day Care Act7 '1 heralded the end of the Great Society
promises of publicly-supported child care for all parents.7' As Great
Society programs were dismantled, regulatory efforts like the
FIDCR generated increasing controversy.
From their inception, FIDCR provisions had the same intrinsic
weakness that had always undermined state licensing laws: they
67. HEW undertook this in response to 1967 amendments to the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964. See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 2, 81
Stat. 672 (codified at 42 USC § 2702 (1982)).
68. HEW PAPERS, supra note 9, at 34.
69. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 3(f), 88 Stat. 2337,
2349 (repealed 1981).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a (1982). Title XX provided federal funds for child care for low-
income families since 1975. The funds went to the states, which then purchased child-care
services directly from providers. Children from eligible families were placed in program slots
subsidized by the Title XX funds. Although states could use these funds for a wide variety of
social services, Title XX actually mandated that a portion of them be allocated to child-care
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(A) (1982).
71. H.R. 13520 91st Cong., 85 Stat. 866 (Sept. 24, 1971).
72. Nixon's veto message expressed the belief that day care weakens families, and that a
"family centered approach" was preferable to communal approaches to childrearing. Ironi-
cally, Nixon had earlier been a strong proponent of day care for poor women. The duality
inherent in his position reflected the "cultural ambivalence about child-care" that originated
during the progressive era. See text supra note 34; GREENMAN, supra note 50; C. JOFFEE,
supra note 34, at 3.
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were drafted as "goals" rather than enforceable obligations. 3 The
public affected by the FIDCR-day-care consumers, providers, and
state regulatory officials-had not participated in drafting them,7 4
and several attempted to enjoin their enforcement in federal court.7
Many people also mistakenly believed that the FIDCR applied to all
facilities, not just federally-funded ones.7  Moreover, the FIDCR
were never adopted by all federal agencies; the Defense Department
and Headstart programs continued to apply their own regulatory
standards.77 Even the agencies that did adopt the FIDCR showed
little inclination to enforce them.7 8
A good deal of the controversy stemmed from the FIDCR's at-
tempt at "cooperative federalism." Title XX required the states to
enforce compliance with the FIDCR, and the regulations authorized
severe sanctions against states that failed to do so.79 However, the
federal government never provided guidance to the states on how to
monitor compliance, and never imposed any of the sanctions. 80
State agencies struggled to devise administrative structures that
73. See supra note 37, and accompanying text. See also HEW REPORT, supra note 66,
at 146:
The language of the FIDCR often raises questions about the mandatory status
of individual provisions .... HEW policy-makers contributed to the confu-
sion over the degree of compliance required by the FIDCR. In October 1975,
Stephen Kurzman, the Assistant Secretary for Legislation, testified before the
Congress that the Department regarded the FIDCR as goals and would work
with the States to develop good faith efforts to meet them rather than concen-
trate on strict enforcement.
Id.
74. HEW REPORT, supra note 66, at xxix.
75. E.g., Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (three-judge court).
This litigation was brought by day-care operators and parents. Both claimed that the FIDCR
staffing ratios would result in dramatically increased costs, causing the centers to close and the
parents to quit work, thus depriving both parents and proprietors of property without due
process of law. The three-judge court held that the FIDCR portion of Title XX was constitu-
tional under the Spending Power; and the statute and HEW regulation 45 C.F.R. § 228.42
were not so irrational as to violate due process. The court cited Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) for the point that FIDCR "may exact a needless, wasteful require-
ment in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement." Id.
76. Senator Bartlet of Oklahoma testified against the FIDCR in 1975 on the basis of a
misapprehension that they applied to "every day-care center in the United States ... regard-
less of State laws to the contray. ... Hearings on S. 2425, Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-23 (Comm. Print Oct. 8, 1975).
77. HEW REPORT, supra note 66, at xxxii.
78. Id. at xxix.
79. The Secretary of HEW had authority to withold a state's entire Title XX grant for
failure to administer the FIDCR, or to deny payment for any day care that did not meet the
FIDCR requirements. 45 C.F.R. §§ 228.13 and 228.42.
80. HEW REPORT, supra note 66, at 151.
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would meet their Tile XX obligations. Some "piggy-backed"
FIDCR activities onto state licensing procedures, and others actually
revised their licensing codes to incorporate FIDCR provisions.81 But
no one was really satisfied with the implementation of these require-
ments. Even HEW concluded that:
[T]he organizational model a State follows to implement
FIDCR enforcement .. .does not appear to be related to how
effective a State is in complying with the regulations ...
[T]here is only inconclusive, anecdotal information on compli-
ance because it is difficult to determine what constitutes compli-
ance. As mentioned earlier, the lack of specificity in the lan-
guage of the FIDCR leaves them open to wide variations in
interpretation.82
After more than a decade of confusion and protest about the
FIDCR, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
developed new child-care regulations to replace them.83 Most of
these regulations went into effect in October 1980, but two months
later, Congress postponed their effective date as it debated massive
cutbacks in social services.84 Finally, as part of the Social Services
Block Grant program enacted in 1981,85 Congress eliminated the
statutory basis for the FIDCR, and HHS repealed them in Febru-
ary 1982.86 Between 1981 and 1984, child-care services subsidized
with block grant funds had only to comply with "applicable stan-
dards of state and local laws." 87
Publicity about child abuse during 1984 prompted Congress to
renew some efforts at standard-setting. First, Congress required the
HHS to draft a Model Child Care Standards Act for the states' con-
sideration, by January 12, 1985.88 Second, Congress authorized
81. Id. at 152-4.
82. Id. at 137; see also LEGAL AspEcTs, supra note 9, at 38.
83. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,870 (1980).
84. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, Title X, §
1001(a)(D)(b), 94 Stat. 2655 (Dec. 5, 1980).
85. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title XXIII, §
2353(s), 95 Stat. 357, 874. See Historical Note in annotation to 42 U.S.C. § 1397a. See also
Zeitlin & Campbell, STRA'EGIF.s To ADDRESS THE IMPAcr OF THE ECONOMIc RECOVERY
TAX A'T OF 1981 AND THE. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION AT OF 1981 ON THE
AvAI.AII.rY OF CHI.D CARE FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 49, n.173 (1982).
86. 47 Fed. Reg. 7,668 (Feb. 22, 1982).
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2352, 95 Stat.
357. This Act also amended the substantive provisions of Title XX in a number of significant
ways. See generally Zeitlin & Campbell, supra note 85, at 51-55.
88. H.J. Res. 648, enacted as part of Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title IV, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984). Congress specified six areas to be covered in the Model Standards Act: (1) Training,
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(without appropriation) child abuse prevention activities by the
states, which would be eligible for federal funds during fiscal 1986.89
Third, Congress authorized and appropriated $25 million under the
Title XX Social Services Block Grant to be distributed as training
funds for providers, operators, and staffs of federally subsidized day
care.
90
While it is still too early to evaluate the impact of these federal
initiatives, it is at least clear that their scope is far narrower than
that of the FIDCR.9 The primary focus is on prevention of child
abuse, and the responsibility for such prevention has been delegated
to the states. 2 The most that can be said is that states are struggling,
with almost no guidance from the federal government, to devise pro-
cedures for checking the employment history, background, and crimi-
nal records of current and prospective child care workers. 3 In doing
so, the states are confronting logistical and legal problems that revive
all the federal/state tensions that were prompted by the FIDCR.9 '
Moreover, while the public supports new vigilance about child
abuse, the states may be adopting screening measures that are inef-
fective and violative of civil liberties.9 5
development, supervision, and evaluation of staff; (2) Parent Visitation; (3) Staff-Child Ratios;
(4) Job qualification requirements, by classification; (5) Probation periods for new staff; (6)
Employment history for new staff.
89. Id.
90. In order to avoid losing half of these funds during fiscal year 1986-87, however,
states must have in effect by September 30, 1985: (1) procedures established by state law or
regulations to provide for employment history and background checks, and (2) provisions of
state law consistent with Pub. L. No. 92-544, Title 11, 86 Stat. 1115 (1972) requiring nation-
wide criminal record checks for all current and prospective operators, staff, or employees. Id.
91. The "Model Day Care Standards and Guidance To States To Prevent Child
Abuse" issued by HHS in January 1985 could have reactivated the FIDCR. Instead it merely
paraphrased the six areas contained in Congress' enabling legislation, and appended child-care
standards from the Child Welfare League, National Association for the Education of Young
Children, and the National Child Care Management Association. (Copies available from
Marie Byrd, Publications, Office of Human Development Services, 200 Independence Ave.
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20201).
92. See supra note 90.
93. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, HHS REGION X, PREVENTING SEXUAL
ABUSE IN DAY CARE PROGRAMS, (Draft Report, November 1984).
94. See generally A. Cohen, VIGILANT IN THE PROTECTION OF OUR CHILDREN OR
VIGILANTES? LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DRAFTING SCREENING LAWS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN IN CHILD CARE SETTINGS, REPORT OF CHILD
CARE LAW CENTER 2-5 (1985).
95. Child abuse experts agree that using registries of family-based child abuse will not
help to screen out institutional child abuse. Unfortunately, the consensus seems to be that
"prediction based on known profiles or indicators is not possible with our current level of
knowledge." V. J. Fontana, M.D. and J. D. Alfaro, Letter to the editor N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1984; see also D. Gordon, No Child Abuse, No Adult Abuse, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985,
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H. Concluding Historical Observation
This historical discussion should make clear that day care regu-
lation has confronted many of the same issues for almost a century.
Section III will examine these issues in their current policy formula-
tions, and will provide the factual background for the legal discus-
sion that follows in Section IV.
III. DAY-CARE REGULATION IN THE 1980's
A. The Day-Care Markets
The demand for day care in the 1980's is greater than ever
before. Between 1940 and 1976, the number of working mothers in-
creased tenfold.96 In 1965, twenty percent of mothers with children
under six worked outside the home;9 7 by 1982, the figure was fifty
percent, and it was even higher (sixty-six percent) for mothers of
children between six and eighteen.9 The rate at which mothers are
entering the labor force continues to grow, 99 and it is estimated that
by 1990, forty-four percent of the nation's twenty-three million pre-
school children will have mothers working outside the home."'
The number of day-care facilities in the United States is also
growing, although no one knows exactly how many there are.1"1 In
part because Congress was thwarted in its effort to establish a com-
prehensive, nationwide child-care delivery system,1"2 the choices
available to parents resemble "a patchwork quilt made up of public
and private programs provided by individuals and groups in a vari-
(Op-Ed page).
96. GREENMAN, supra note 50, at 7.
97. Johnson, Marital and Family Characteristics of the Labor Force 102 MONTHLY
LABOR REV. 48, 52 (April 1979).
98. SEIEC. COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 98TH CONG., 1st Sess.,
U.S. CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND RECENT TRENDS 13
(Comm. Print 1983).
99. S. Hofferth, Day Care In The Next Decade: 1980-1990 41 J. MAR. AND FAM.
649-58 (Aug. 1979).
100. C. Barsky & M. Personick, The Outlook For Industry Output and Employment
Through 1990, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 29 (April 1981); see generally Zeitlin & Campbell,
supra note 85, at 3-8.
101. In 1978, there were approximately 18,300 licensed day-care centers, serving about
900,000 children. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CHILD CARE AND PRESCHOOL: OPTIONS FOR
FEDERAL. SUPPORT 7 (1978). Even if the most generous estimate of family day-care slots were
added to this figure, see infra, note 113, it would not come close to approximating the number
of preschool children in need of day care. See generally CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, EM-
PI.OYED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A DATA BOOR (1982).
102. See supra notes 71-72. See also 129 CONG. REC. 125 (Jan. 26, 1983) (remarks of
Sen. Cranston introducing S. 4, the proposed Child Care Assistance Act of 1983).
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ety of settings, including homes and centers, licensed and nonregu-
lated services. '"03
Day care is provided in "almost every conceivable setting," in-
cluding homes, storefronts, warehouses, hospitals, garages, schools,
hospitals, and church basements."0 4 Despite this range of programs
and settings, day-care providers may be categorized into three broad
groups which were introduced in the historical section of this article.
1. Subsidized Day Care
The first category consists of nonprofit centers and a few li-
censed family day-care homes that receive government subsidies or
charitable support from entities such as the United Way. The subsi-
dies enable nonprofit programs to serve low-income children, making
them direct descendants of the institutions that cared for "dependent
children" in the early 1900's. These programs were formerly subject
to the FIDCR, and they must now comply with whatever regulatory
"strings" are attached to their present subsidies. Nonprofit, subsi-
dized programs have "received the lion's share of the public and pro-
fessional attention and resources.'
0 5
2. Proprietary Day Care
The second category consists of private facilities that are oper-
ated as profitmaking businesses. They depend on fees paid by par-
ents,1 06 and range from small "Mom-and-Pop" centers to chains of
day-care franchises, of which there are now more than 150.07 The
category also includes centers operated by a handful of large corpo-
rations for their employees, and preschool programs that originated
as half-day nursery schools but now provide full-day care for infants
or toddlers as well as children over three.'08
103. P. Siegel & M. Lawrence, Information, Referral, and Resource Centers, re-
printed in MAKING DAYCARE BETrER 227 (Greenman & Fuqua, eds. 1984).
104. GREENMAN, supra note 50, at 8-9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The largest, Kinder Care Learning Centers, operates about 850 day-care centers
throughout the country. Other large companies are LePetit Academy of Kansas City, Mis-
souri; Children's World of Evergreen, Colorado, and National Child Care Centers of Houston,
Texas. Lindsey, supra note 1, at 16.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 55. By the 1970's, the private nursery
schools that had assiduously differentiated themselves from "day care" since the 1920's had to
begin defining themselves as day-care programs in order to remain open. So many working
parents needed full day-care for their young children that there were no longer enough "tradi-
tional" middle class families to support half-day nursery school programs. Integrating nursery
19851
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3. Family Day Care
The third category consists of family day-care homes, "the most
widely used and least understood form of child-care," which are re-
sponsible for nearly half of all children who receive out-of-home
child-care. 0 9 Family day care is provided in the home of a friend or
neighbor, who also often cares for his or her own children or those of
a relative."' The typical group size is three children,"' though most
states allow family day-care providers to care for up to six chil-
dren." 2 Because it is home-based, family day-care varies in atmo-
sphere and program much more than center-based care does."'
Family day-care homes are also harder to regulate; it has been esti-
mated that ninety-four percent of such homes are unregulated.""
None of the three broad categories is necessarily better than the
others."' Each is different enough from the others, though, that
some day-care advocates argue that they merit different regulatory
approaches." 6
schools into day-care regulation has varied. As of 1971, 10 states specifically included private
nursery schools in the definition of day-care facilities requiring licensing; 14 states and the
District of Columbia were not explicit, but could be read to include them. Five states expressly
exempted them, and 10 others exempted them if they were operated as part of an established
private school or system. HEW, ABSTRACT OF STATE DAY CARE LICENSING REQUIRE-
MENIS, PART 2: DAY CARE CENTERS (DHEW Pub. No. 73-22, 1971). The current approach
is similarly varied.
109. Sale, Family Day Care Homes, reprinted in MAKING DAYCARE BETTER 21
(Greenman & Fuqua, eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Sale]; see also EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
FAMILY DAY CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DAY
CARE HOME STUDY 2 (1981) [hereinafter NDCHS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
110. NDCJS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 46.
111. Id. at 27.
112. E.g., TEXAS HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 42.002(9) (Vernon 1982); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1597.50 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.302 (West 1973);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1209 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 23, § 2212.18 (West, 1968);
IOWA CODE ANN., supra § 237A.3 (West, 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-518 (1980); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.111(f)(iii) (West Supp. 1984).
113. Each family day-care provider brings his or her culture, values, housekeep-
ing skills, and personal ideas and moods to the home he or she shares with other
people's children . . . . The home may be located in a small walkup apartment
in a densely populated urban area, a house with limited outdoor space in the
inner city, or a house with enough outdoor space for the children to romp freely
.... The program may vary from being very informal with no scheduled ac-
tivities, to being highly structured with a lesson plan for each week.
Sale, supra note 109, at 22.
114. Sale, supra note 109, at 22.
115. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CHILD CARE AND PRESCHOOL: OPTIONS
FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT (1978).
116. See GREENMAN, supra note 50, at 9; L. Bennetts, Parents Find A Wide Variety Of
Day Care Quality In U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1984, at 7, col. 1; Morgan, Change Through
Regulation, reprinted in MAKING DAY CARE BETTER 177-80 (Greenman & Fuqua, eds.
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In some cases, the interests of all three categories of day-care
providers are the same; in other cases their interests are obviously
different. The paragraphs that follow, which set forth a range of
policy concerns that day-care advocates are currently presenting to
lawmakers, illustrate the varying agendas of the three broad day-
care constituencies.11 It should be apparent at the end of this discus-
sion that a legal framework is necessary to resolve many of the policy
concerns.
B. Current Policy Issues In Day-Care Regulations
1. Policy Issue 1: Overlapping Regulatory Schemes Should Be
Strengthened Or Unified
State licensing agencies are not the only official entities regulat-
ing child-care facilities. Most states have several overlapping bureau-
cracies that enforce different sets of legal requirements for day-care
providers. In addition to enforcement by licensing agencies, state or
local fire marshals enforce building and fire codes;"' and state or
local health departments enforce sanitation and health codes." 9 Fur-
1984) [hereinafter cited as Change Through Regulation].
117. These policy issues concern regulatory matters, not the fundamental imperfections
in the day-care market. The latter issues, which include demand that far outstrips supply, poor
access to information about day care, decreases in the number of slots for low-income children,
and unaffordable services, extend beyond the scope of this article. See generally D. R. Pow-
ELL, FINDING CHILD CARE: A STUDY OF PARENTS; SEARCH PROCESSES (1980); CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN AND FEDERAL CHILD CARE CUTS 5-11 (1983); R. Neugebauer,
The Relationship Of The Day Care Center To Its External Environment, reprinted in MAK-
ING DAYCARE BErrER 112 (Greenman & Fuqua, eds. 1984); R. RuoPP, J. TRAVERS, F.
GLANTZ & C. COELEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DAY CARE STUDY (1979);
Ruopp and Travers, Janus Faces Day Care: Perspectives on Quality and Cost, reprinted in
DAY 'CARE: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES (E.F. Zigler and E.W. Gordon, eds.
1982); Bennetts, supra note 116.
118. E.g., California and Illinois require the state fire marshal to conduct annual in-
spections of all day-care centers (but not family day-care homes), pursuant to a uniform state
code, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13143 (West 1984); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 12712, § 9
(1953) and ILL. ADMIN. REG. § 407 (1981); Florida requires annual fire inspections of day-
care centers and family day homes, pursuant to local fire codes FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.305-6
(West 1984); Ohio requires annual inspections of centers (but not family day homes) by local
fire inspectors, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.05(B) (Page 1981); Michigan requires centers
and family day homes to be inspected once by a "qualified fire inspector," pursuant to local
fire codes, MICH. COMp. LAWS § 722.113 (West Supp. 1984); and New Jersey requires a fire
inspection for centers every three years, conducted by its licensing agency, N.J. ADMIN. CODE
10:122-1.1 (1982).
119. Ohio and North Carolina have uniform statewide health codes requiring annual
inspections of day-care centers by local health inspectors or sanitarians. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5104.05.1 (Page, 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130.170 (1981); Texas has local health
inspectors doing annual inspections pursuant to local health codes. TEX. STAT. ANN. Art.
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thermore, state welfare departments must enforce the licensing
codes,12 and city or county governments must enforce the local zon-
ing ordinances that deliberately or inadvertently exclude day-care fa-
cilities from specified land uses. 12 1
Even the most diligent providers of day care endure frustrating
delays and expense to comply with these overlapping requirements.
Only a few states have made any effort to coordinate and consolidate
them, "' yet such an effort represents the most salutary change in
4442a(2) (Vernon 1976); New Jersey and California require such inspections every three
years. N.J. REv. STAT. § 26.IA-9, 18, 23 (1964); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17920;
17953 (West 1984).
120. E.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-1 To-17 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.35 (1984); ARIZ.
S'A-r. ANN. § 36-881 (West Supp. 1975-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-801 (1983); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1500 (West 1979, Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-6-101
(1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-436 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 390
(Michie 1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-301 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.301 (West 1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 99-201 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 19, Ch. 346-18 to 26 (1976); ILL.
REV. STAr. ch. 23 § 2211 (1968 and Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-1 (Burns 1973);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1211 and 39-1213 to 22 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 237A.1 (West
Supp. 1984); KAN. S'tAT. ANN. § 39-1001 (1981) (day care for mentally retarded and handi-
capped children) and § 65-501 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199-896 (1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-1401-1412 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 22 §§ 7701-7805 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, 20B-36C (MD) § 26 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 28A, § 1-16 (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.111-125 (1968 & Supp.
1984); MINN. S'Ar. ANN. § 245.781-801 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-20-1 to -21 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 210.201-245 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§53-4-501 to 515 (1983). NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1901 to 1918 (licensing) (Supp. 1984); NEv.
REV. SrTA. Ch. 432A.131-.220 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E: 1-20 (Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAr. ANN. 18A:70-1 (West 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7A.1 (1983); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW. § 390 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108.78 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50.06 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.01 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10 § 401 (West 1966); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.805 (1983); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1001
(Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 40-13-7 (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2980(1) (Law-
yers Co-op. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-10-
101 (1980); TEXAS HUM. RES. CODE § 42.001 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-9-1
(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2852 (1981); VA. CODE § 63.1-195 (1980); N. VA. CODE §
49-2B-2 (1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.65 (West 1979); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-101
(Michie 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.15.010 (1982).
121. Day care can be inhibited by zoning ordinances that (a) fail to list it as a permissi-
ble use; or (b) deliberately exclude it from permissible uses; or (c) consider it to be a commer-
cial use rather than an "essential community service." When day care is not listed or is delib-
erately excluded, day-care providers must seek a "variance" from the zoning provisions and go
through public hearings that often require legal assistance. When day care is classified as a
"commercial" use, providers must often pay a fee to conduct their "commercial" venture. This
adds another cost to the already expensive delivery of day care. Day-care providers may also
face zoning requirements that are inconsistent with state licensing requirements. Change
Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 165.
122. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-883(G) (1974) and HAWAII REV. STAT. § 346-
20 (1976), both of which mandate a comprehensive biennial review of day-care rules and
regulations in consultation with the state fire marshal, state department of education, and
other agencies; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-911 (1976), which vests regulatory powers in a "Child
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day-care regulations that could be achieved by reform-minded legis-
lators. Each of the three broad day-care constituencies support the
goal of streamlining the regulatory process, although they sometimes
disagree about which state agency should have regulatory
authority.'23
2. Policy Issue 2: Day-Care Facilities Should Be Distinguished
From Other Regulated Community Care Facilities
Many regulatory efforts are still hampered by a failure to dis-
tinguish day care for children from other regulated services. Most
statutes govern not only day-care facilities but the full range of
"child-caring institutions." Some statutes purport to govern all
"community care facilities," including day-care centers, homes for
the elderly, foster homes, and homes for unwed mothers.'24 This ge-
neric approach ignores critical differences in the services provided,
populations served, and ability of consumers to monitor health and
safety compliance in the specific type of facility.
For example, foster homes entail twenty-four hour care, and
presuppose the absence or non-involvement of a child's natural par-
ents. The government's watchdog role in such a situation should ex-
ceed what is appropriate in the day-care context, in which parents
have a daily opportunity to observe the facilities used by their chil-
dren, and to complain about any deficiencies they perceive.' 25
Day care and nursing home care differ even more sharply.
Care Facility Review Board" consisting of the Commissioner of Public Welfare, the State
Health Officer, as well as parent and provider representatives; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-
43c (West 1977), which mandates a "Child Day Care Council" with representatives from all
relevant state bureaucracies; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, §§ 1-16 (West, 1981), which
created an Office for Children to coordinate and oversee all children's services, including day
care regulation; GA. CODE ANN. § 99-214.1 (1981), which prescribes fire safety standards to
be used by local fire departments in their inspections of day-care centers.
123. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 165.
124. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1501 (West Supp. 1984), which governs
all "community care facilities," including day-care centers, family day-care homes, foster
homes, and residential care facilities for the elderly; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.1401-1412
(West 1982), which prescribes licensing for all "childcaring institutions," including maternity
homes, agencies placing children in foster homes, adoption agencies, foster homes, group
homes, and day-care centers; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-78 (1979), which covers all "child-
caring institutions," including day care centers, foster homes, and juvenile detention facilities;
OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10 § 401-410 (West 1966), which covers "any public or private insti-
tution, child placing agency, foster family home, group home, day-care center, or family day-
care home. ... ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-10-101 (1980), which covers all "child welfare
agencies" including maternity homes, family boarding homes, group care homes, day-care cen-
ters, child placing agencies, and family day-care homes.
125. LEGAL ASPECTS supra note 9, at 6.
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Nursing homes fit squarely within a medical model of care, and in-
volve complex skills, specialized equipment, and round-the-clock ser-
vices that are difficult or impossible for the general public to evalu-
ate. 26 As such, nursing homes are part of the pervasively regulated
health care industry. Day-care facilities, on the other hand, involve
equipment and teaching materials that parents are in the best posi-
tion to evaluate. Moreover, the population served by day-care is
neither sick nor in need of round-the-clock care.
Although it might be possible under existing statutes to promul-
gate different sets of regulatory standards for different types of facili-
ties (one set for foster homes, another for juvenile detention group
homes, yet another for day-care centers), there is no guarantee that
this will occur. Any legislation that purports to cover a broad range
of community care facilities conveys the false impression that they
have more similarities than differences. Such legislation may also
confuse the people responsible for drafting the regulations."' There
is much to be said for legislation that treats day care as sui generis,
or at least urges regulators to remember the intrinsic differences be-
tween day care and other "child-care" entities. 2 s
3. Policy Issue 3: Day-Care Facilities Should Be Distinguished
From Schools
Numerous day-care facilities are styled "nursery schools" or
"preschools," and other day-care facilities that do not use the word
"school" nonetheless provide highly educational programs. Proprie-
126. Arguably, day care can be considered a "closely regulated industry," subject to
extensive monitoring and warrantless searches. See Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.
1985), reversing, 517 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Nonetheless, day care does not fit
within the medical model of care appropriate to nursing home regulation. See generally Cali-
fornia Governor's Advisory Comm. On Child Development, CHILD CARE LICENSING AND
REGULATIONS 6-8 (1978)[hereinafter cited as GAC Report].
127. In at least one state, laudable efforts to revise day-care regulations floundered be-
cause the drafters assumed they were dealing with a medical model of care; the voluminous
standards they proposed approximated the minutiae of nursing home regulations, rather than
the minimum standards for day care. GAC Report, supra note 126, at 6-8.
128. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2700 (Lawyers Co-op, 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §
237A.1 (West, 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-43B (West, 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
31, § 390 (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-501 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.01
(Page 1981), all of which govern "child day-care facilities" exclusively. See also TEX. HUM.
RES. CODE § 42.042 (Vernon 1975), "In promulgating minimum standards the department
may recognize and treat differently the following child-care facilities: child-caring institutions,
foster homes, day-care centers, group day-care homes, family day homes, registered family
homes, and agency homes;" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2852 (1981), which legislatively distin-
guishes between foster care and day-care facilities, even though both are covered by the same
licensing provisions. See also LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 11.
[Vol. 25
1985] DAY-CARE REGULATION
tary centers that are descendants of the nursery school movement 29
have particular difficulty accepting the fact that if they now provide
full-day care, they fall within the same regulatory purview as all
other day-care centers.
Thus, some day-care facilities have contended that they should
be regulated by their state department or board of education-whose
jurisdiction over public and private schools is separate from that of
state agencies regulating day care. Courts presented with such con-
tentions look to the function, purpose, and operational hours, rather
than the names the centers have chosen, but the issue of their catego-
rization continues to arise in litigation. 3 Classification is compli-
cated in certain states by the fact that public schools do provide some
day-care services.13' Because such programs are funded by the school
authorities, it is appropriate that they be regulated by the depart-
ment of education and exempt from other day-care regulation. " 2
Most day-care delivery, however, is not part of the public or private
school system,' and its "essential function . . . is to provide care
and safety," not education. 34 Thus, it is important to distinguish
schools from day-care facilities for regulatory purposes. Many state
laws would benefit from clearer specification of the distinctions.'
129. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 55.
130. E.g., Montessori School House Inc. v. Department of Social Servs., 120 Cal. App.
3d 248, 175 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1981) (Montessori school provided "the kind of services intended to
be regulated" by the day-care licensing act, whether or not it called itself a "school."); cf
Possekel v. O'Donnell, 51 111. App. 3d 313 (1977) (regardless of whether a licensed day-care
center offers educational instruction, the Child Care Act defines its liability by injury to chil-
dren, not by the School code's immunity provision); Johnson v. Department of Social Servs.,
123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981) (preschool is subject to the day care licensing
regulations which prohibit corporal punishment; it is not deprived of equal protection merely
because schools are allowed to administer corporal punishment; schools and day care facilities
are not similarly situated).
131. See generally Grubb & Lazerson, Child Care, Government Financing, and the
Public Schools: Lessons From The California Children's Centers, 86 SCHooL REVIEW 5
(1977).
132. Cf Kiddie Korner v. Board of Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134 (1981) (use of school
property for after-school child care, provided by private day-care facility under contract, meets
public purpose doctrine because designed to improve educational achievements of "latch-key"
children).
133. See supra text accompanying note 96.
134. Johnson v. Department of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 885 (1981).
135. E.g., Texas' previous licensing statute, (now repealed) exempted "bona fide educa-
tional facilities," but specified no criteria for such facilities. The current statute is far more
precise, excluding the following educational entities from licensing:
(7) an educational facility accredited by the Central Education Agency or the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools that operates primarily for educa-
tional purposes in kindergarten and above;
(8) an educational facility that operates solely for educational purposes in grades
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4. Policy Issue 4: Day-Care Facilities Should Conform to En-
forceable Minimum Standards, Developed with Input from Con-
sumers, Providers, and Regulators
Some regulatory bodies still misconstrue the purpose of day-care
standards, which should be to establish a floor of quality below
which no day-care facility may go.""6 Few would disagree that day
care should strive towards developmental programs of the highest
quality. However, the intangible attributes of the best child-care pro-
grams (the warmth, humor, and flexibility of the caregivers) cannot
be enforced adequately.' Unless regulatory provisions are consid-
ered "minimum requirements," dealing with such measurable crite-
ria as physical space, staffing ratios, appropriateness of corporal
punishment, parental involvement, and equipment, they are
unenforceable. 88
Regulatory schemes that emphasize lofty goals rather than min-
imum standards result from the influence of the child welfare orga-
nizations that helped state agencies devise day-care standards.'39 Al-
though this particular result is misguided, the concept of input from
interested members of a day-care community is valid and consistent
with basic tenets of administrative law. The input, however, must
come from more than one constituency. As one advocate of regula-
tory reform has proposed:
-The federal government or a national organization should
kindergarten through at least grade two, that does not provide custodial care for
more than one hour during the hours before or after the customary school day,
and that is a member of an organization that promulgates, publishes, and re-
quires compliance with health, safety, and sanitation standards equal to stan-
dards required by state, municipal, and county codes;
(9) a kindergarten or preschool educational program that is operated as part of
a public school or a private school accredited by the Central Education Agency,
that offers educational programs through grade six, and that does not provide
custodial care during the hours before or after the customary school day.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 695(c) (Vernon 1976). See also ALA. CODE § 38-7-2(8)
(1975).
136. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 178; see also TEXAS DEP'T OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, A REPORT ON DAY-CARE LICENSING 5-6 (1984)[hereinafter cited as
TDHR REPORT].
137. A. Collins & E. Watsun, FAMILY DAY CARE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PAR-
ENTS, CAREGIVERS, AND PROFESSIONALS 125 (1976).
138. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 168; R. Collins, Child Care And
The States: The Comparative Licensing Study, YOUNG CHILDREN 3 (July 1983); Who's
Minding The Kids, 3 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS J. 15-17 (1982); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR CHILD CARE MANAGEMENT, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR DAY CARE CENTERS (April
1983) (available from NACCM, 1800 M Street NW, Suite 1030N, Washington D.C. 20036).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 38, and 73.
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maintain an ongoing record of current state requirements for
licensing, building code requirements for day-care, and specific
day-care sanitation codes for use by other states at the time of
revising requirements;
-Licensing statutes should designate advisory task forces to assist
state agencies in developing standards;
-Participants in these task forces should represent the whole
spectrum of the day-care community-not just providers and
regulators, but also consumers, academics, and information and
referral organizations;
-Task force participants should have access to orientation
materials "to assure good communication and full understand-
ing of the nature of licensing requirements. "0
While no state has implemented all of these suggestions, several
have recently undertaken to make the process more fair. Some laws
designate task forces to assist state agencies in drafting day-care reg-
ulations. 4 ' Others have almost eliminated the state agencies, by em-
powering a Child-Care Advisory Board to draft regulations, handle
consumer complaints, and generally enforce the day-care require-
ments." Utilization of broad input allows the various day-care con-
stituencies to help devise more realistic and workable rules, and also
reflects a commitment to make official regulatory bodies accountable
to the public.
5. Policy Question 5: Few Exemptions from Regulatory Mini-
mums Should be Granted
The three broad categories of day-care providers are most likely
to disagree on the need for exemptions from specific regulatory pro-
visions. Proprietary centers are distinguishable from nonprofit pro-
grams, and both are different from family day-care. However, day-
care regulation is predicated on notions of consumer protection," 3
and if minimum standards truly represent the "floor" below which
no facility should go, then there should be a presumption against
exempting facilities from such standards.
Exempting one type of day-care facility from regulatory provi-
140. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 141.
141. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-893 (1975 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-
6-109 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-43C (West 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 237.22
(West 1969); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.08 (Page 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2980
(Lawyers Co-op, 1983).
142. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-911 (1976).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 179-183.
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sions will inevitably trigger litigation, because exemptions are ex-
plicit classifications that may raise equal protection questions.'44 If
challenged in court, an exemption's ultimate validity will be deter-
mined as a matter of constitutional law rather than public policy. 4
That is certainly the case with the most common day-care exemption
for church-based day-care programs. These programs will survive
only if fundamental First Amendment rights are held to overcome
the state's legitimate interest in health and safety.' 46
On the other hand, a legislative decision not to write any ex-
emptions into a regulatory scheme will probably go unchallenged,
because no explicit classifications have been created. 47 Given the im-
portance of minimum standards in day-care, policy-makers should
decline to exempt particular categories of day-care from regulation.
If different types of day-care facilities merit slightly different ap-
proaches to regulation, policymakers can incorporate those differ-
ences into the regulatory scheme, without taking the extraordinary
measure of exempting one type of facility altogether.
6. Policy Questions 6: Regulators Need More Efficient Enforce-
ment Tools
Agencies charged with enforcing day-care regulations presently
have insufficient enforcement methods and sanctions for use against
144. See infra § IV.D.
145. See, e.g., Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Luckhard, 728 F.2d 230 (4th
Cir. 1984) (religious exemption unconstitutional); Arkansas Day Care Ass'n v. Clinton, 577 F.
Supp. 388 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (religious exemption held unconstitutional); Samkel v. Creasy,
455 N.E.2d 493 (1983) (statute's non-inclusion of proprietary centers effectively constituted a
permissible exemption); Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of
Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Tex 1979) (abstention for challenge to religious
exemption); Milwaukee Montessori School v. Percy, 473 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(exemption for private and parochial schools from day-care licensing unconstitutional under
loose standard of equal protection review); Kansas v. Heart Ministries, 227 Kan. 244, 607
P.2d 1102 (1980) (licensing of church-based day-care permissible); Yellow Duck Nursery v.
Department of Institutions & Agencies, 155 N.J. Super. 56, 382 A.2d 381 (1977) (exemption
of public and nonprofit centers from regulations governing proprietaries must be subject to
equal protection review on remand); Op. Att'y Gen. Texas, No. JM-98 (Dec. 19, 1983) (ex-
emption for specified schools from new day-care licensing act is constitutional).
146. See generally CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND REPORTS, WHEN CHURCH AND STATE
CONFLICT 4 (Feb. 1984); C. SANGER, CHILD CARE LAW CENTER PUBLICATIONS, DAY CARE
LICENSING AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: AN OVERVIEW FOR PROVIDERS (1985). The pol-
icy of religious exemptions from day-care regulation is beyond the scope of this article. The
legal discussion in Section IV, infra, will, however, compare the standards that courts use to
evaluate religious vs. nonreligious exemptions.
147. Religious exemption seekers are probably the only parties likely to challenge a
statute for failing to grant an exemption. They are unlikely to be successful. E.g., State of
Texas v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (S. Ct. Tex. 1984).
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day-care violators. This insufficiency is evident at each stage of the
regulatory process-from prelicense screening to revocation of ex-
isting licenses-and it is partly attributable to lack of knowledge.
For example, most statutes prohibit licensing persons with
criminal convictions, or histories of child abuse and neglect. 4 ' How-
ever, current background checks (relying upon registries of family-
based child abuse) fail to screen out perpetrators of institutional
child abuse.149 Existing information and studies have not generated
reliable profiles or indicators of institutional child abuse, and until
such information exists, regulatory agencies may simply be incapable
of screening out day-care facilities where abuse may occur.' 50
This puts more pressure on regulatory agencies to enforce the
law against facilities that are already licensed. Most agencies have
authority to seek injunctive relief in order to close a facility, but they
are dependent on the state attorney general or county attorney to
represent them in court.15' These legal offices frequently consider
day-care compliance a low priority, or have limited resources that
hamper enforcement efforts. Even egregious violators are hard to
penalize. 152
Moreover, even assuming that a licensing agency does have ef-
fective legal support, injunctive relief may not be a sufficiently severe
148. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.06 (Page, 1981), which requires the licensing
agency to "ascertain" that "neither the administrator nor any employee has been convicted of
child abuse or other crime involving moral turpitude"; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1522
(West Supp. 1984), which requires the licensing agency to "secure from an appropriate law
enforcement agency a criminal record to determine whether the applicant . . .has ever been
convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic violation;" COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-6-108(2)(a)
(1982), which bars licensing of anyone "convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude"
but does not indicate how the licensing agency ascertains such a conviction. In many states, the
statute does not specify what types of criminal convictions preclude licensing; specification is
left to the "minimum standards" (i.e. regulations), and the statute is silent as to the agency's
authority to conduct criminal checks. See generally TDHR REPORT, supra note 136, at Table
6.
149. Even worse, they destroy employment opportunities for many people who have
never mistreated a child. In the wake of publicity about child abuse in a Bronx day-care
center, hundreds of New York day-care workers and applicants were fingerprinted in late
1984. Less than half of 1% had felony convictions, and none of the workers actually charged
with abuse at the Bronx center were found to have criminal records. D. R. Gordon, No Child
Abuse, No Adult Abuse, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, (Op-Ed page).
150. See supra notes 94 and 95.
151. E.g., AI.A. CODE § 38-7-17 (1975) (duty of district attorney to enforce chapter or
prosecute violations); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-886 (West Supp. 1975-84) (department
can "request" criminal prosecution by county attorney, or injunctive relief by attorney gen-
eral); Coi.o. REv. STAT. § 26-6-111 (1982) (attorney general must seek injunctive relief to
enforce licensing statute); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 19-43k (West 1977) (commissioner may
"request" attorney general to bring injunctive action).
152. TDHR REPORT, supra note 136, at 10.
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penalty for some violations. Day-care providers guilty of child abuse
or neglect should be subjected to criminal prosecutions; yet the li-
censing agency may not have the authority to initiate such proceed-
ings, or to remain involved in them once another agency takes
charge. 153
Although many present sanctions are too lax, closing down a
facility may sometimes be too harsh a measure. Facilities with tech-
nical violations-ones that do not jeopardize health and
safety-often go unremedied because licensing statutes do not pro-
vide an intermediate range of sanctions. Effective sanctions for tech-
nical violations might include fines, additional monitoring visits,
press releases and media publicity about violations, and notification
of facility patrons when technical violations exist. 54
Better enforcement of day-care regulation will require legisla-
tive changes giving regulatory agencies more effective control over a
greater range of sanctions. New legislation must also recognize the
costs of such measures, and recent publicity about child abuse in
day-care centers may generate public support for increased
appropriations.
7. Policy Question 7: Regulation of Family Day Care Should
Be Different From Regulation Of Center-Based Care
Family day-care has always raised difficult issues, because regu-
lation through licensing has failed so consistently. While state regu-
latory efforts reach about ninety-five percent of all center-based day-
care, they miss almost that percentage of family day-care homes.'55
Numerous attributes of family day care make it difficult to regulate:
the large number of caregivers, the small number of children cared
for in each home, the casual way that many providers enter the mar-
153. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 42.076 (VERNON 1980), provides criminal penalties only
for operating without a licensed facility. In a situation of child abuse, licensing officials must
work with the "protective services" arm of the state Dep't of Human Resources, whose policies
and procedures are different. TDHR REPORTS, supra note 136, at 14. With a properly
drafted statute, compliance with licensing requirements may be compelled by civil injunctive
relief or criminal action or both. E.g., Cavanaugh v. State Dep't of Social Servs. 644 P.2d I
(Colo. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1011 (1983). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 26-6-112
(1982) (any violation of licensing act or intentional false statement is a misdemeanor); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1540 (West Supp. 1984) (violation of statute or willful/repeated
violation of regulation thereunder is misdemeanor).
154. See Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 183; TDHR REPORT, supra
note 136, at 9-12.
155. Sale, supra note 109, at 21.
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ket, and the location of family day care in private homes.156
Disincentives to regulation operate on both the regulators and
the providers of family day care. The regulators face logistical com-
plications and costs:
[Bly its very nature, family day-care is very costly to supervise.
A typical licensed home may have only three children. On a
per-child basis, the cost of licensing and monitoring a home is,
therefore, burdensome in comparison with the costs of monitor-
ing and licensing a day-care center where the average enroll-
ment may be fifty or more.' 57
Providers of family day-care resent the outside interference that
licensing entails:
Like a family, there is great reluctance to give a government
body the right to come into the place we call home, and tell us
how to raise our children, how many children we may have,
how we should feed them, teach them, etc . . . . [T]his is how
many, probably most, family day-care providers feel.'
Many parents who are either unaware that this type of day care is
subject to regulation, or who realize that regulation does not guaran-
tee health and safety compliance, appear willing to use family day
care homes whether or not they are licensed. 59
There are three ways to deal with these problems. The first is
to deregulate family day care altogether, thereby abandoning the no-
tion of consumer protection. The second is to develop several regula-
tory models that are tailored to the realities of family day care and
that differentiate it from center-based care. The third is to continue
regulating family day care as if it were identical to center-based care.
156. Child Care Law, "Issue Paper: Family Day Care Regulation" 1 (1983); see also
GAC Report, supra note 126, at 10:
[I]t is necessary to emphasize the differences between family day care and center
care. Family day-care homes are obviously smaller and have fewer children.
The relations between care-givers and parents tend to be more consistent than is
true in centers where there is a larger staff and more turnover. Because family
day care takes place in a home, health and safety issues are easier for parents to
evaluate than may be true for centers. Because of their small size, administrative
problems-such as paperwork and visits involved in the licensing process-are
especially burdensome ....
Id.
157. NDCHS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 27.
158. Sale, supra note 109, at 10.
159. NDCHS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 32. See also GAC REPORT,
supra note 126 at 10; Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 170. It is possible that
parental willingness to use unlicensed family day care is due to the sheer unavailability of
affordable day care.
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As a matter of policy, the second approach makes the most sense,
and many states are developing new regulatory models for family
day care."' °
The most prevalent mode is registration. Family day-care prov-
iders register with a specified government agency and certify that
they meet health and safety requirements. Registration does not nec-
essarily entail inspections, although some registration systems pro-
vide for home visits to a random sample of family day-care provid-
ers. 6' The state agency then makes the list of registered homes
available to parents, and puts the burden of verifying compliance on
the parents. By giving parents copies of the health and safety re-
quirements, encouraging them to report violations, and inspecting
promptly when parents complain, the regulations reinforce the con-
sumers' role in enforcing day-care standards. It appears to be suc-
ceeding in a number of states, particularly those with computer
capability. 6
2
Another regulatory approach is the licensing of family day-care
"systems," which are networks of homes operated under the admin-
istrative auspices of an "umbrella" sponsoring organization." 8 The
umbrella agency is granted a license to cover all the family day-care
homes in its network. The license-holding agency is responsible for
visiting the homes in its system, monitoring compliance with stan-
dards, and risking loss of its license if a member of its system fails to
meet those standards.
Few states have actually implemented this system; in 1981 there
were about 30,000 family day-care homes under such umbrellas,
representing about two percent of all family day-care facilities. 64
Because no state could force all family day-care homes to become
160. "There is little debate over whether or not family day care should be regulated.
The disagreement arises over the form that regulation should take." Sale, supra note 109, at
33; Adams, Family Day Care Regulations: State Policies In Transition, I DAY CARE J. 9-13
(1982).
161. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-511 (1983) (annual inspection of 15% of all regis-
tered homes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 237A.4 (West Supp. 1984-85) (Periodic Inspections);
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.115(2) (West Supp. 1984) (inspection within 90 days of
registration; then 10% sample).
162. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 170. States that have experi-
mented with registration have seen both an increase in the percentage of facilities submitting to
regulation, and a decrease in the cost of regulation. See GAC REPORT, supra note 126, at 11;
Adams, supra note 160, at 10; MICHIGAN DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DEMONSTRATION PRO-
JECT FOR THE REGISTRATION OF FAMILY DAY CARE HOMES (FINAL REPORT) (1977).
163. NDCHS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 43.
164. Adams, supra note 160, at 11. In 1981, family day-care systems provided care for
most state and federally subsidized children in family day-care settings. NDCHS EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 43; Sale, supra note 109, at 40-41.
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part of a such system, this approach is "not a complete answer to the
issue of regulating family day-care."1 5 It is nonetheless important
because it reinforces the notion that family day-care regulation must
be differentiated from regulation of day-care centers.
C. Concluding Observation About Policy Issues
The issues summarized above represent the salient policy con-
cerns of day-care providers, consumers, and regulators at this time.
Because of the polyglot nature of the day-care community, however,
only the first two issues have attracted anything like a consensus. As
to the other issues, the point of view expressed in this article reflects
the position of many prominent day-care advocates; but it must be
acknowledged that some members of the day-care community con-
tinue to press for exemptions, or regulation by school authorities, or
higher than "minimum standards."
Many of these issues present legal questions as well as policy
concerns, but the debate in the day-care community does not always
include pertinent legal doctrines and arguments. Section VI will ad-
dress the major legal questions that arise in connection with day-care
regulation, and will provide lawmakers and regulatory officials with
a legal framework for evaluating day-care proposals from all
constituencies.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING DAY-CARE
REGULATION
A. Introduction
Serious regulatory reform works only if it complies with basic
administrative and constitutional law doctrines. Thus, policymakers
contemplating changes in day-care regulation should understand the
doctrines, and tailor their reform efforts to the relevant legal
requirements.
One such requirement is that the state must have the power to
regulate, and must delegate that power to a specific agency. Another
is that the agency must understand the parameters of the power
165. Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 171. Another factor that will
keep family day-care systems from proliferating is the likelihood that family day-care providers
will be considered employees of the umbrella agency rather than independent contractors. This
makes the nonprofit umbrella agency liable for unemployment insurance for an untenable
number of "employees" and has forced existing family day-care systems to close. See In The
Matter Of NVCC Child Care Centers, Inc., Liability Decision #119, pursuant to VA. CODE
§ 60.1-70 (1984).
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given to it, and must act within those parameters. A third require-
ment is that the agency's methods of implementing its regulatory
power must comply with the constitutional dictates of due process
and equal protection. If a regulatory scheme fails to satisfy these
mandates, it can be invalidated by a court.
This section will define the legal terms that govern the concepts
outlined above; apply the concepts to general approaches to day-care
regulation; and test them against specific regulatory provisions that
have been adopted throughout the country. The purpose of this dis-
cussion is two-fold. One purpose is to give day-care advocates and
policy makers the basic legal framework they need to evaluate regu-
latory options. The second purpose is to analyze which options seem
to resolve the policy concerns mentioned in Section III, and at the
same time meet the legal requirements to be set forth in this Section.
B. Regulatory Authority Derives from Police Powers and Parens
Patriae
The major source of state regulatory authority over day-care
services is the "police power," a concept that has been applied in
American jurisprudence since the early nineteenth century. 66 The
police power is generally defined as the power to legislate for the
health, morals, safety, and welfare of the community.' 67 If properly
exercised, the police power can justify burdens on the enjoyment of
private property without triggering any government obligation to
compensate.' 68
166. The phrase "police power" was first used by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 323 (1978). The concept was applied in the land use context in Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)(11 Pet). See generally R. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STATE POLICE POWER (1957).
167. B. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 42-44 (1965).
168. While the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the states
through the 14th Amendment, prohibits the taking of property without just compensation,
mere regulation of the use of property is not the same thing as a "taking." E.g., Day-Brite
Lighting v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952):
Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enter-
prise for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of our
civilization .... The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The
moral, social, economic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of
it; the political well-being, another. The police power which is adequate to fix
the financial burden for one is adequate for the other.
Id.
It is, however, possible for regulation to go too far and to amount to a "taking." See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (prescribing a balancing test to deter-
mine when a land use regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking).
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Police power has been the predicate for Supreme Court deci-
sions upholding state licensing laws, 6" land use restrictions,1 70
health and safety measures,1 71 and zoning provisions.1 71 State courts
have also relied upon the police power to uphold countless regulatory
provisions, including some relating to day careY 3
Because the state seeks to control individual and institutional
behavior through licensing, the relationship between police power
and licensing has received particular attention from courts and com-
mentators. 174 Professor Ernst Freund's definition of licensing-"the
administrative lifting of a legislative prohibition"-expresses this
relationship.'7 5
169. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding
state law prohibiting any person from making/fitting eyeglasses unless licensed as opthalmolo-
gist or optometrist); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (upholding state law making
"good moral character" a criterion for M.D. licensing); Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1889) (upholding state medical licensing statute); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504 (1847).
170. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hemptstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding building
code) See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149
(1971); Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, appealed dis-
missed 344 U.S. 919, (1953) (upholding minimum size requirements); Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding city ordinance barring livery stables in thickly
populated areas).
171. E.g., Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829)
(Delaware could safeguard the health of its citizens by draining a marshy creek that was
technically an interstate waterway).
172. E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (ordinance requiring all
residences to be single-family served legitimate police power goal of preserving quiet family
neighborhoods); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding comprehensive
zoning plan, including use, height, and area restrictions).
173. E.g., Wininger v. Texas Dep't. of Human Resources, 663 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Ct.
App., 1983) (upholding child-care licensing statute as valid exercise of state police power);
State of Missouri v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. of App. 1975) (zoning ordinance, as
"legislative exercise of the delegated police power," does not bar juvenile group home); Ocean
House Corp. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 147 Cal. App. 3d 395, 195 Cal. Rptr. 147
(1983) (state community care facilities act is a "comprehensive regulatory scheme" superseding
local rent control ordinance).
174. See generally E. Freund, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROP-
ERTY (1923); E. Freund, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 447 (1933); 51 Am. Jur.
2d Licenses § 1 (1970); Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational
Licenses In California, 14 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1962); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1899); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 2; G. Binder & N. Class, The Nature of Welfare Licensing
Laws, SOCIAL CASEWORK (1957).
175. E.Freund, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 447 (1933). A more practical def-
inition of a license appeared in J. HUNT, J. BOWER, & N. MILLER, LAWS, LICENSES, AND
THE OFFENDER'S RIGHT To WORK 4 (ABA 1973). See also M. Carrow, THE LICENSING
POWER IN NEW YORK CITY 7 (1968):
A privilege granted by a governmental jurisdiction, such as a city or state, per-
mitting an applicant for a license to engage in an activity that he would not be
entitled to conduct without a license. (citations omitted) Every state has enacted
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Licensing agencies perform two main functions: controlling en-
try into the trade and supporting/enforcing standards of practice re-
quired of licensed practitioners. 170  Social work Professor Norris
Class, in one of his discussions of police power, explained:
The State has the authority to regulate private enterprise for the
general welfare. First the public becomes aware of an activity,
such as the daytime care of children, the unregulated conduct of
which is not in the public interest. Legislation is then enacted to
prohibit the activity generally, and an administrative agency is
designated to permit the activity specifically, through the issu-
ance of licenses. This is the administrative lifting of a legislative
prohibition-the essential feature of any licensing operation.'
7 1
Thus, there should be no question that state governments have the
power to regulate day-care services, whether such services are deliv-
ered by nonprofit/philanthropic entities or by proprietary/commer-
cial ones. 78
Moreover, it is not only the state's "police powers" that author-
ize regulatory oversight, but also the state's parens patriae role.' 79
Traditionally, parens patriae applied when parents were absent and
not able to look after their own children.
licensing laws and created agencies to regulate the issuance or suspension of
licenses ....
d.
The federal Administrative Procedure Act defines "license" to include:
The whole or a part of an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration,
charter membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission; . . . 'li-
censing' includes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revoca-
tion, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification,
or conditioning of a license ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(8), (9) (1977).
176. The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or
tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as
well as of deception and fraud.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 120 (1889).
See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 192-4 (1898) (upholding the good "moral
character" requirement of medical licensing law):
No precise limits have been placed upon the police power of a state and yet it is
clear that legislation which simply defines the qualifications of one who at-
tempts to practice medicine is a proper exercise of that power. Care for the
public health is something confessedly belonging to the domain of that power.
Id.
177. Id. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 7.
178. Id.
179. These words mean "father of his country," and in English common law they ap-
plied to the king; today, they "are used to designate the state, referring to its sovereign power
of guardianship over persons under disability." In re Turner, 94 Kan. 719, 145 P. 871 (1915).
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Every statute which designed to give protection, care, and train-
ing to children, as a needed substitute for parental authority and
performance of parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of
the state, as the legitimate guardian and protector of children
where other guardianship fails.180
Recent case law has extended the parens patriae doctrine to
situations when parents are present and even when the doctrine dis-
agrees with the state's protective measures. One of the clearest exam-
ples occurred in Prince v. Massachusetts,18 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a state law barring child labor despite parental wishes:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults . . . . A democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.
It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers
within a broad range of selection . . . . It is too late now to
doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils
is within the state's police power, [even] against the parent's
claim to control of the child. 8"
More recently, a California appellate court invoked parens pa-
triae to justify a day-care regulation prohibiting corporal punish-
ment, even though parents wanted their child's nursery school to use
it.'8 ' The Kansas Supreme Court also invoked parens patriae to up-
hold the licensing, inspection, and regulation of residential child-care
facilities, as prescribed by a statute that also covered day-care facili-
ties. 8 4 Further, the Ninth Circuit recently bowed to the "vital gov-
ernmental interest in the protection of children," to uphold warrant-
less inspections of family day-care homes.' 8
180. Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 391, 79 N.W. 422,
427 (1899).
181. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding state prohibition against child labor in case where
child was helping parent distribute religious handbills).
182. Id. at 168-69.
183. Johnson v. Dep't of Social Servs,. 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 886, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49,
53 (1981) (When parental decisions may jeopardize the health or safety of a child, the state
may assert important interests in safeguarding health and safety).
184. Kansas v. Heart Ministries, 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102 (1980).
185. Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 713, (9th Cir. 1985). Although the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's holding that warrantless searches of family day-care homes were
unconstitutional, it did not disturb the dictum that:
The state has a strong and important interest in protecting, via inspection, the
health and welfare of the children in care. Children are entitled to special pro-
tection and solicitude from the state; enforcing standards of quality in extra-
familial child care is a legitimate and indeed laudable goal of state regulation.
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A state's interest in protecting young children from harm can
sustain governmental actions that would probably not be constitu-
tional if directed towards adults.'1 6 If the parens patriae doctrine
can overcome such constitutional infirmities, it should afortiori but-
tress state regulations with a clear, constitutional basis in the police
power.
However, merely concluding that states have the power to regu-
late day-care does not end the legal inquiry. Police powers must be
exercised within specific limits, and any statute or regulatory scheme
may be challenged for exceeding them. The remainder of this section
will address those limits, explain the legal standards that define
them, and evaluate particular day-care provisions in light of them.
C. Delegation Of Legitimate Police Powers
1. The Unlawful Delegation Doctrine
Statutes that delegate police power to administrative agencies
must contain standards to guide the agency in implementing its man-
date. If they do not, the statutes may be unconstitutional under the
"unlawful delegation" doctrine. 8
This doctrine recognizes that legislative bodies must be able to
entrust administrative agencies "with broad control over activities
which in their detail cannot be dealt with directly by the Legisla-
ture."'88 But the legislative bodies must also provide discernible stan-
dards to limit the agencies.
The courts insist on this for two reasons. First, they fear that
administrators may indulge in arbitrary actions when their dis-
517 F. Supp. 905, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
186. Id. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state may prohibit distribution of
materials to minors which may not be barred from adults); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King
County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam), affd, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(parent cannot withhold blood transfusion from child, even on religious grounds); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state may protect children from exploitive and exhaust-
ing labor, even if done in the name of religious exercise). See also 43 C.J.S. INFANTS § 5.
187. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 151-2 (1984). See also State
v. Gilroy, 37 Wash. 2d 41, 221 P.2d 549, 552 (1950):
The principle is ... that a law is invalid when the authority delegated leaves
the regulatory or enforcement agency with unguided and unrestricted discretion
in the assigned field. Stated affirmatively, the method of regulation by delegation
of authority is subject to the limitation that the law providing for the delegation
must also prescribe an accompanying rule of action or lay down a guide or
standard whereby the exercise of discretion may be measured ....
Id.
188. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14 (1938). Unlawful delegations are deter-
mined according to state constitutional law. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 10.
[Vol. 25
DAY-CARE REGULATION
cretion is unrestricted. Such arbitrary action would violate the
concept of due process of law . . . .Secondly, the courts refuse
to allow the Legislature to divest itself of its duty to make law;
delegation without standard-"delegation run riot"--would
give the administrator power to make law.18
Courts and administrative law experts have disagreed about
how specific the legislative standards must be. An early New York
licensing law, which covered boarding homes, day nurseries, and pri-
vate schools, was held to be an unlawful delegation because it merely
authorized the state agency to "make such rules and regulations as it
deems best,"' 90 while an almost identical California statute satisfied
the criteria for lawful delegations under the state constitution. 9'
In 1950, the Washington Supreme Court overturned the state
child-care licensing law as an "arbitrary, unlimited, and unconstitu-
tional delegation of the legislative function," because it merely re-
quired the licensing director to be "satisfied" about the applicant's
"intentions," ''provisions for capable workers," and "desirability for
the public welfare."' 92 The statute contained no standards to guide
the director's determinations. This prompted the court to write:
We can conceive of few requirements more susceptible to the
individual whim, caprice, and personal prejudices of a director.
• ..[Moreover] the differences of opinion between the various
social agencies in the field of child-care as to what constitutes
capable or trained workers suggests that different directors
might have widely divergent views on that subject. 9
Despite such strong criticisms, commentators note that "some
state high courts would have little difficulty sustaining the ...
Washington law."' 94 Indeed, in the past, very broad delegations have
been upheld when conditions cannot conveniently be investigated by
the legislative branch,"95 or when
[Tihe discretion to be exercised relates to police regulations for
the protection of public morals, health, safety, or general wel-
189. Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 81 N.E.2d 80
(1948).
190. Note, State, Church, and Child-Statutory Provisions for School Permit, 1 STAN.
L. REv. 316, 317 (1949).
191. Note, supra note 189, at 324.
192. State v. Gilroy, 37 Wash. 2d 41, 221 P.2d 549, 554 (1950).
193. Id. at 552.
194. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 13.
195. Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 289, 143 S.W.2d
79, 87 (1940).
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fare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without destroying
the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to
carry out the legislative will . . ..
Nevertheless, recent developments suggest that greater specific-
ity will be required in order for statutes to satisfy the delegation
doctrine. 197 Particularly in the context of day-care regulation, courts
and commentators seem to be exacting increasingly precise delega-
tions from legislative authority.
For example, Illinois' licensing law was upheld in 1965 because
it set forth "eleven specific areas with which the Department shall be
concerned in promulgating rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the act."'198 Texas' current day-care licensing law,199 which was
challenged in court shortly after its enactment in 1977,200 has been
upheld because its general delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Department of Human Resources was "followed by sixteen guide-
lines more specific with respect to standards, as well as by definitive
sections on immunization of children, inspection of child-care homes,
and licensing, thereby overcoming any doubt implying vagueness or
generality in the Act."'2 ' The delegation in Ohio's current licensing
196. Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 121 A.2d 816, 822 (1956); see also Akron
& B. Belt R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 148 Ohio St. 276, 74 N.E.2d 256 (1947).
[Wihen the discretion to be exercised relates to a police regulation for the pro-
tection of the public morals, health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impossi-
ble or impracticable to provide such standards, and to do so would defeat the
legislative object sought to be accomplished, legislation conferring such discre-
tion may be valid and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations.
Id.
197. This trend was presaged in Note, supra note 189, at 325:
Even though the [broad delegation] is upheld, we hope the California Legisla-
ture is not content to leave it, and the whole problem of private school regula-
tion, in the present condition. More definite and detailed standards should be
provided as a guide for the regulations. The present rules . . . tend to require
ideal physical conditions; it might be wiser to make the Department give greater
consideration to existing circumstances. Finally, the Legislature should re-ex-
amine the desirability of exempting sectarian organizations from laws designed
to protect child welfare.
id.
198. People ex rel. Dep't of Children and Family Servs. v. Illinois Protestant Children's
Home, Inc., 210 N.E.2d 217, 219, 33 III. 2d 60 (1965).
199. TEx. HuM. REs. CODE ANN. § 42.001-.076 (Vernon, 1980).
200. Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557 (3rd Ct. Civ. Apps. 1977); Wininger v. Texas
Dep't of Human Resources, 663 S.W.2d 913 (2nd Ct. of Apps. 1983).
201. Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d at 560. The court went on to hold that:
The Legislature did not go beyond its recognized constitutional right to delegate
to an administrative agency authority to establish rules, regulations, and mini-
mum standards reasonably necessary to carry out the expressed purposes of the
Act which are to guard and protect the health, safety, and well-being of children
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law,2 °2 on the other hand, was found to be so specific and narrow
that it permitted the state Department of Public Welfare to issue
regulations governing only nonprofit day-care centers.2"' While the
Department contended that the statute implicitly delegated authority
over proprietary centers, the court read the statute closely and held:
[An implicit delegation of such claimed rulemaking authority
was not intended by the General Assembly . . [The statute]
grants the Director of Public Welfare authority to prescribe
only the manner of licensing, and authority to issue orders to
insure compliance with the statute. This section does not supply
the director with authority to establish standards for compliance
as a condition to licensing.0 4
These decisions suggest that broad delegations of police power
in the social welfare or public health areas may no longer by accept-
able as a matter of state constitutional law.20 5 Statutes that do not
formulate substantive guidelines for the rulemaking activities of state
agencies may be increasingly vulnerable. 06
of the state who reside in child care facilities.
Id.
In Wininger v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 663 S.W.2d at 915, the court followed
Oxford v. Hill, and held that: "in defining regular care and the minimum standards ...
regulating registered family homes, the Department of Human Resources was exercising its
duty to establish rules, regulations, and minimum standards."
202. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.02, 5104.01 (Page 1981). Relevant sections of this
statute provide that "The director of public welfare shall establish procedures to be followed in
inspecting and licensing child day-care centers . . . .The director may issue orders to secure
compliance with Chapter 5104 ....
203. Samkel, Inc. v. Creasy, 7 Ohio St. 3d 17, 455 N.E.2d 493 (1983).
204. Id. at 494.
205. As a matter of policy, they have long been questioned:
[Specificity) gives the applicant for a license an indication of the areas in which
he must accept regulations, and helps the staff of the administrative agency to
determine what the matters are with which it should be concerned. Welfare
licensing, in particular, since it is a new field, has not fully clarified the licens-
ing responsibility or defined the licensing job. Methods are still being tested
empirically and there are many individual differences among workers.
-Binder & Class, The Nature of Welfare Licensing, SOCIAL CASEWORK (1957).
206. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. §346-20 (1976) (prescribing standards "to protect the
best interests of minor children"); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 2852 (prescribing regulations to
insure that children receive "wholesome growth and educational experiences, and are not sub-
ject to neglect, mistreatment, or immoral surroundings").
It is possible to give more substantive guidance to regulatory agencies. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-4-504 (1983), which prescribes standards on:
(1) character, suitability, and qualifications of an applicant and other persons
directly responsible for the care of children;
(2) the number of individuals or staff required for adequate supervision and
care of children in day-care facilities;
(3) child-care programs and practices necessary to ensure the health, safety,
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2. A Caveat About Too Much Specificity
There is, however, a limit to the detail that should be written
into statutes, for if they are too specific, the legislative intent may be
to delegate no discretion to the agency. Samkel Inc. v. Creasy,2",
held that Ohio's licensing statute delegated no rulemaking authority
over proprietary day-care facilities. This conclusion was supported
by two observations. One was that the statute gave the agency power
to issue standards only "for part-time day-care centers."208 The sec-
ond was that the statute itself contained a list of "minimum require-
ments" as comprehensive as most states' administrative rules. 09
The Ohio statute, and the recent state supreme court decision
construing it, demonstrate that overly specific legislative standards
can undermine the basic goals of delegation as much as overly vague
ones can.
safety in transportation, development, and well-being of children;
(4) adequate and appropriate admission policies;
(5) adequacy of physical facilities and equipment;
(6) general financial ability and competence of an applicant to provide necessary
care for children and maintain prescribed standards;
(7) the ages and numbers of children that may be cared for in a day-care
facility.
Id.
See also IowA CODE ANN. § 237A.12; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.305 (regarding minimum
standards on nutrition and food services); IowA CODE ANN. § 237A.12; ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-883 (regarding parental participation and staff training); and COLO. REV. STAT. §
26-6-106; A.A. CODE § 38-7-7 (regarding discipline of children).
207. 7 Ohio St. 3d 17, 455 N.E. 2d 493 (1983).
208. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.061 (Page 1981).
209. For example, instead of merely authorizing the Dep't. of Public Welfare to issue
rules on "physical facilities," e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 237A.12(2), Ohio's statute requires
day-care centers to have
for each toddler, pre-school child, school-age child, and infant for whom the
center is licensed, at least thirty-five square feet of indoor floor space wall-to-
wall regularly available for the day care operation exclusive of any part of the
structure in which the care of children is prohibited by law or by rules adopted
by the board of building standards . . . [and] a safe outdoor play space which is
enclosed by a fence or otherwise protected from traffic or other hazards . . .
[containing] not less than sixty square feet per toddler, pre-school child, or
school-age child using such space at any one time ....
-OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.06(A)-(B) (Page 1981).
The statute is similarly specific about medical emergencies, required immunizations of staff
and children and procedures for ill children. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.06(D)-(E) (Page
1981). Most state licensing statutes simply authorize state agencies to issue rules on "health,
safety, and medical policies for children." E.g. IOWA CODE ANN. § 127A.12(8). Specificity and
detail are normally left to the agency's regulatory provisions. See, e.g. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, § 16001 (1984); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 50.125 (1982); ARiz. ADMIN. COMp. R.
9-5-5101 (1983); IowA ADMIN. CODE § 770-109.1 (1983); ILL. ADMIN. REG. § 407 (1981).
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3. Is Piecemeal Delegation Unlawful Delegation?
In an ideal world, legislatures would delegate their police pow-
ers only after comprehensive study of an issue and careful evaluation
of which state agency would best implement legislative goals. In the
real world, however, "not every situation that must be dealt with can
be foreseen by the legislature,"210 and delegation of police power
often stems from early legislation that is substantially amended in
the course of years. State legislatures try to keep pace as the needs of
the population and economy grow more complex, but they must
often react to crises and rarely have the luxury of addressing the
complete range of issues at once.
This crisis orientation may result in legislative gaps, or in the
creation of regulatory agencies with overlapping authority. The lat-
ter has occurred in the day-care context."' The pertinent legal ques-
tion is whether the creation of such overlaps, or a failure to eliminate
them when they are revealed, constitutes an unlawful delegation of
the police power.
There are several scenariog in which multiple agencies might
regulate the same industry; not all of them present delegation
problems. For example, the unlawful delegation doctrine does not
preclude a state legislature from making one agency responsible for
licensing and another agency responsible for enforcing fire safety, as
210. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has strongly criticized judicial opinions on the dele-
gation doctrine for failing to recognize these legislative realities. See, e.g., K. C. DAvIs, Dis-
CREIrONARY JusTICE 45-46 (1979):
A clear statement of legislative objectives in every delegation of power is un-
questionably desirable whenever the legislative body is itself clear about its
objectives. Furthermore, legislative bodies should unquestionably strive for such
clarity. But the lack of meaningful standards in statutes which delegate power
seldom stems from a draftsman's failure to put into words the objectives that
have taken shape in the minds of legislators, or committee members, or of com-
mittee staffs. The lack of meaningful standards almost always results from one
or more of three facts and usually from a mixture of all three: (1) Each legisla-
tor and each assistant to a legislator concerned with a bill has limited confidence
in his own capacity in the time available to dig very far into the specialized
subject matter, and such a state of mind produces general and vague formula-
tions of objectives, not specific and precise ones; (2) developing policies with
respect to difficult subject matter often can best be accomplished by considering
one concrete problem at a time, as an agency may do; [and] (3) subject matter
calling for delegation is often highly controversial; the more specific the state-
ment of legislative objectives the more difficult the achievement of a consensus
that can be supported by a majority of each house and win the signature of the
executive.
Id.
211. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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long as "clear, discernible standards" govern each agency.212 But if
the legislature fails to "clarify the relationships among governmental
departments" it may "open the way for confusion and denial of re-
sponsibility" 218-the very type of arbitrary decisionmaking that trig-
gered the unlawful delegation doctrine.21
When compliance with one set of regulations would mean viola-
tion of another, the day-care community would have a strong argu-
ment that the legislature's delegation of power to one or both agen-
cies was unlawful. The delegation doctrine requires "clear,
discernible" standards to guide administrative discretion. Standards
cannot be clear and discernible if they engender divergent and con-
flicting regulatory actions. If, on the other hand, both agencies used
the same fire safety standards, or consistent ones, then there would
be no delegation problem, for the standards must have been clear
and discernible enough to prompt identical regulatory action.215
4. Methods of Clarifying Which Powers Have Been Delegated
To Each Agency
a. Careful Legislative Drafting
It is easy to avoid the scenarios mentioned above-particularly
when the overlaps are limited to state agencies. Many state laws
governing day-care explicitly require cooperation among various
state agencies; others incorporate the standards promulgated by the
state fire marshal and/or building inspector into the day-care licens-
ing law.216 The basic point is for the legislature to be aware of regu-
212. See supra note 188.
213. Binder & Class, supra note 205, at 7.
214. See supra text ccompanying note 188. Professor Davis urges that we move away
from the origins of the nondelegation doctrine, and recognize
The plain reality that legislative bodies often are not equipped ...to do more
than to establish a legislative framework within which administrative discretion
must be left largely free. [T]he courts should continue their requirement of
meaningful standards, except that when the legislative body fails to prescribe the
required standards the administrators should be allowed to satisfy the require-
ment by prescribing them within a reasonable time.
K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 58 (1979).
While this article reflects the current judicial approach to nondelegation rather than Prof.
Davis' normative approach, the argument advanced herein about piecemeal delegation could be
accommodated in either one.
215. There may be a due process question about delegating overlapping authority to two
or more agencies. This question and other aspects of due process will be addressed in § IV.C.,
infra.
216. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12 (West 1982) ("The state department of public
welfare shall be responsible for the development of adequate standards of child care, and after
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latory overlaps, and to clarify the relationships among state agencies
before confusion occurs. While such clarification will generally take
the form of precise legislative drafting, along the lines of the statutes
cited, there is another strategy-pre-emption-that is available to
state legislatures when regulatory overlaps and inconsistencies occur
among local agencies. This approach is especially appropriate when
local zoning ordinances conflict with state regulatory efforts.
b. Pre-emption
As previously discussed, it is possible for local zoning ordi-
nances to impede the operation of day-care facilities that have fully
satisfied all licensing, fire safety, and sanitation codes.21 For exam-
ple, day-care providers in Pennsylvania recently challenged a local
zoning ordinance prohibiting group day-care homes that had been
licensed by the state Department of Public Welfare.21 The ordi-
nance did permit licensed family day-care homes. However, the state
had ceased licensing family day-care during the litigation, so the net
effect of the ordinance was to preclude all day-care facilities from
residential zones. The court adjudicating the challenge to this zoning
ordinance acknowledged that the plaintiffs had "reached an
impasse. ' '2 1
9
Zoning authority, like other types of regulatory authority, de-
rives from the state police power.220 In the zoning context, police
power is customarily delegated to cities and towns by state laws that
prescribe standards for the local ordinances and procedures for their
consultation with the state board of health and state fire marshal shall make, prescribe, and
publish such rules and regulations . . ."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 237A.12 (West Supp. 1984)
("Rules relating to fire safety and sanitation shall be promulgated under this chapter by the
state fire marshal and the commissioner of public health respectively, in consultation with the
department [of human services], and all rules shall be developed in consultation with the state
day-care advisory committee."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-505 (1983) (state fire marshal
must "adopt and enforce rules for the protection of children in day care centers..." and the
state Department of Health and Environmental Sciences must "adopt rules for the protection
of children in day care centers from the health hazards of inadequate food preparation, poor
nutrition, and communicable diseases."). VA. CODE § 63.1-196.01 (1980) (coordinating licens-
ing of certain child care centers with permits for summer camps).
217. See supra note 121.
218. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Ross Township v. Harsch, 78 Pa. Commw. 395,
467 A.2d 1183 (1983). The converse of this situation also presents problems, i.e., when the
state licensing agency requires zoning approval as a precondition for seeking a license. What
the licensing agency is doing is "giving local zoning the force of state law"-which most day-
care experts deplore. See Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 173.
219. Board of Comm'rs of Ross Township v. Harsch, 78 Pa. Commw. 395, 399, 467
A.2d at 1185, 1186 (1983).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 166-73.
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adoption." 1 But the state can limit or modify its delegation of zoning
powers "on matters of general or statewide concern," by enacting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that pre-empts local ordinances.222
Municipalities derive their power to regulate land use through
zoning by a legislative grant of authority from the state ....
Municipal zoning ordinances and codes cannot override state
law and policy or exceed the limitations and restrictions im-
posed by enabling or other legislation . . . . Thus, a zoning
code may not authorize what state law expressly forbids nor
may it forbid what a state law expressly permits. 22..
For ease of enforcement, comprehensive state regulatory
schemes should contain explicit pre-emptive language.22' Alterna-
tively, state laws can supersede local zoning ordinances simply by
defining particular facilities as "residential uses" of property. In
Michigan, for example, all state-licensed, residential child-care facil-
ities with fewer than six children statutorily qualify as residential
use.225  In Minnesota, family day-care homes are statutorily
221. State ex. rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (1975) (zoning ordinance, which is
"in fact a legislative exercise of the delegated police power," must either be consonant with
state law governing group juvenile detention homes or will be superseded by the state law).
222. Ocean House Corp. v. Permanent Rent Control Bd. of the City of Santa Monica,
147 Cal. App. 3d 395, 397, 195 Cal. Rptr. 147, 148 (1983) (state Community Care Facilties
Act, which governs licensing of facilities for developmentally disabled, supersedes local rent
control ordinance). See also Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 807, 494 P.2d 681
(1972). In Georgia, however, the state constitution gives zoning power to local governments.
Thus, while the legislature may not pre-empt, it may "establish procedures for the exercises of
zoning power." GA. CoNST. art. IX, § 2-4904 (1983).
223. Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. (Cr. 59a-32) (April 26, 1982).
224. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5120 (West Supp. 1984), which provides:
It is the policy of this state . . . that the care and treatment of mental patients
be provided in the local community. In order to achieve uniform statewide im-
plementation of the policies of this act, it is necessary to establish the statewide
policy that . . . no city or county shall discriminate in the enactment, enforce-
ment, or administration of any zoning laws . . . between the use of property for
the treatment of general hospital or nursing home patients and . . . the psychi-
atric care and treatment of patients.
Id.
This statute was upheld in City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los Angeles,
30 Cal. 3d 516, 638 P.2d 1304, 179 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1982).
225. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 125.286 (West Supp. 1984), which provides:
In order to implement the policy of this state that persons in need of community
residential care shall not be excluded by zoning from the benefits of normal
residential surrounding, a state-licensed residential facility providing supervision
or care, or both, to 6 or less persons, shall be considered a residential use of
property for the purposes of zoning and a permitted use in all residential zones
Id.
This provision was construed and upheld in Erickson v. Department of Social Serv., 108
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equivalent to private residences for zoning purposes. 26 And in Cali-
fornia, family day-care homes may not be treated differently from
single-family residences for zoning and building code purposes.22
When state statutes are not this explicit, courts still look to the
"whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme," and will find
pre-emption if they discern a "statewide plan" that seeks to "insure
continuity . . . under state law" and contains "both procedural and
substantive" components.2 8 Less than explicit state laws may not
lead to this result.
In Board of Commissioners of Ross Township v. Harsch,29 a
Pennsylvania court declined to hold that the state licensing law pre-
empted local zoning restrictions on day care. While it did find the
particular ordinance violative of due process because it was exclu-
sionary, the court nonetheless stated:
The Public Welfare Code has not pre-empted the field of day-
care regulation to such an extent that the township cannot affect
it by zoning limitations. Our review of the Public Welfare Code
discloses neither specific language nor any inference that the
legislature intended to so restrict the police power of municipal-
ities in this area that they may not impose zoning restrictions on
day-care centers.230
The decision suggests that the Public Welfare Code could have
been more explicit about pre-empting local zoning initiatives by de-
fining family day-care as a residential use, and day-care centers as
"essential community services" rather than commercial uses.281 As it
Mich. App. 473 310 N.W.2d 428 (1981).
226. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.812(3) (West Supp. 1985), which provides: "A
licensed residential facility serving six or fewer persons or a licensed day care facility serving
twelve or fewer persons shall be considered a permitted single family residential use of prop-
erty for the purposes of zoning." A similar statute, requiring that group homes for the men-
tally retarded be treated as private residence, was recently upheld by the state supreme court.
Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 315 N.W.2 21 (1982). Minnesota's Attorney General cites
Costley in ruling that the state could define foster care and family day care as residential uses.
See supra note 223.
227. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1529.5 (West Supp. 1984).
228. Ocean House Corp. v. Permanent Rent Control Board of Santa Monica, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 396-97, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. This case held that California's Community
Care Facilities Act pre-empted a local rent control ordinance. The same act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1527 (West Supp. 1984), also governs day care licensing.
229. 78 Pa. Commw. 395, 399, 467 A.2d 1183, 1186 (1983).
230. Id.
231. See Change Through Regulation, supra note 116, at 182. An alternative would be
to define family day care as a "home occupation" that would be permissible under any zoning
ordinance providing for such a use in residential zones. See, e.g., Schofield v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of Township of Dennis, 169 N.J. Super. 150, 404 A.2d 357 (1979) (family day
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was, the court handed regulatory discretion back to local zoning au-
thorities, and merely invited the state legislature to pre-empt it
explicitly.
If either party had invoked the unlawful delegation doctrine, it
is possible that the Pennsylvania court could have issued an order to
the state legislature rather than a mere invitation. The court might
well have concluded that this piecemeal delegation of police powers
was unlawful, because it produced two agencies in blatant conflict
with each other and two mutually exclusive regulatory schemes.
Such a ruling would have imposed a more exacting obligation on the
state legislature, since both the day-care licensing act and state zon-
ing law would need amending.
Including pre-emptive language in state day-care regulatory
codes should not be undertaken lightly. The drafting must be precise;
the legislative history must be clear;... and the state legislature must
understand that it is destroying the possibility of flexible responses to
local conditions.233 Nonetheless, pre-emption does represent one
method of overcoming piecemeal regulation, and it has become in-
creasingly common in legislation governing community-based mental
care is considered a home occupation under local ordinance, but not operation of a day-care
center). However, this drafting alternative is less desirable than defining family day care as a
residential use. Recently, family-day care homes have been challenged for violating "residential
use" deed restrictions, and the better view is that family day care is a residential use, whose
business attributes are "merely incidental to the provider's primary purpose of living in the
home. See, e.g., Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982) (family day care not
barred by restrictive covenant in deed, since it satisfied "residential purpose" of deed restric-
tion); Berry v. Hemlepp, 460 S.W.2d 352 (1970) (day-care center caring for 15-25 children
violated deed restriction on residential use).
Pressure to call family day care a "home occupation" probably comes from the insurance
industry. Most insurers consider family day care to be a "business pursuit" that will trigger an
exclusionary clause in homeowners' policies; thus, the policies will not cover accidents or inju-
ries that occur in the course of the family day-care. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Moore, 103 I11. App.3d 250, 430 N.E.2d 641 (1981); but see Camden Fire Insurance Ass'n.
v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1982) (unlicensed provider who is not always paid for
caring for neighbor children, and who does not advertise, is not engaged in "business pur-
suit"); Robinson v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1979) (whether family day
care is a business pursuit is question of fact, and insurer cannot prevail as matter of summary
judgment).
232. For an example of the close judicial scrutiny accorded the statutory language and
legislative history of pre-emptions, see City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los
Angeles, 30 Cal. 3d 516, 638 P.2d 1304, 179 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1982), see also supra note 224.
233. In the absence of statewide pre-emption, local zoning ordinances are difficult to
challenge, even when they adversely affect disadvantaged population groups. Cf Cleburne Liv-
ing Center v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), en bane denied, 735
F.2d 832, affd in part, 53 U.S.L.W. 5022 (July 1, 1985) (affirming the Fifth Circuit holding
that zoning ordinances prohibiting group homes for mentally retarded in city's "apartment
house district" violated the equal protection clause under a loose standard of review).
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health facilities. 2 4 Thus, policymakers who conclude that pre-emp-
tion is an appropriate strategy for day-care regulation can look to a
related field for model statutes and guidance.
D. Day-Care Regulation and the Due Process Clause
The delegation doctrine is not the only constitutional standard
that day-care regulation must satisfy. Even if a state legislature has
lawfully delegated its police powers to one or more agencies, the stat-
ute must comport with due process, as must the rules and regulations
thereafter promulgated by the agencies. Due process concepts apply
both to the substantive regulatory provisions of a statute or regula-
tion, and to the procedural safeguards contained within any regula-
tory scheme.23  This section begins with an examination of substan-
tive due process considerations in day-care regulation, and concludes
with a look at the procedural due process issues.
1. Substantive Due Process Considerations
In raising substantive due process issues, it is possible to chal-
lenge a statute in combination with its regulations,"' a statute by
itself,23 7 or a regulation by itself.238 In general, the same approach to
substantive due process applies to all three challenges. Most substan-
tive due process claims allege that a regulation (or statute, or combi-
nation thereof) is "arbitrary and unreasonable. ' '23 9 If it is found to
234. See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796 (W. D. Okla. 1977) (Title XX child
care provision and FIDCR staffing ratios were not arbitrary and capricious, and did not vio-
late parents' or providers' due process rights); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1926)
(state overregulation of foreign language schools in Hawaii violated parents' liberty interest in
directing their children's education).
236. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting teaching "in any
language other than English" violated parents' Fifth Amendment liberty interest in choosing
appropriate instruction for their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(state law requiring all children to attend public school violates parents' liberty interest in
directing "the upbringing and education" of their children); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state law requiring everyone fitting eyeglasses to be licensed
did not violate liberty interest of opticians).
237. Johnson v. Department of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1981) (regulation prohibiting corporal punishment in day-care facilities did not violate par-
ents' liberty interest in controlling the care and upbringing of their children).
238. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 153-55 (1984).
239. Substantive requirements are the standards and criteria which day-care facilities
must satisfy in order to be allowed to operate-such as adult/child ratios, sanitation require-
ments, fire safety precautions, fingerprinting of teachers, etc. They differ from the procedural
requirements of day-care regulation (also subject to due process scrutiny), which involve such
things as appeals from agency decision, complaint procedures for parents, and the manner in
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be so, and if the arbitrariness infringes upon a liberty or property
interest protected by the due process clause, then a court may invali-
date the state's action.
However, one legal theory applies only to challenge of a regula-
tion itself. This alternate theory prohibits a regulation from exceed-
ing the mandate of the statute it implements. '4 It has been used to
invalidate agency regulations that conflict with an explicit statutory
provision,2" 1 as well as regulations that undermine the general pur-
pose of a statute. 2" This theory has occasionally been invoked in
cases challenging day-care regulations, in addition to the more usual
due process claims.
243
a. The Need For a Liberty of Property Interest
To trigger due process scrutiny for day-care regulation, provid-
ers and consumers of day care must allege infringement of the requi-
site liberty or property interests in the facilities they operate.24' Par-
ents of children in day care also have due process rights, which are
in the realm of "liberty" interests. These "liberty interests" have
been elaborated in the course of fifty years of constitutional
adjudication.
In a 1977 decision on the rights of foster parents, the Supreme
Court stated:
"It is of course true that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of
...family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
which agencies must formulate their standards.
240. E.g., Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524 P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974)
(state welfare regulation was incompatible with governing statutory provisions and therefore
invalid). See also B. Schwartz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 153-55 (1984).
241. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U.S. 356, (1973) (regulation must
be reasonably related to general purpose of enabling legislation).
242. E.g., Atkins v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., 92 Mich. App. 313, 284 N.W.2d
794 (1979) (an administrative rule requiring all residents of family day-care home to be "of
responsible character" does not conflict with statute requiring the licensing regulations be lim-
ited to scrutiny of "persons directly responsible for the care and welfare of the children served
by the home").
243. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)
(even if rule is within agency's delegated authority, it may be invalid if arbitrary or
unreasonable).
244. Cf Atkins, 92 Mich. App. 313, 284 N.W.2d 784 (1979) (hearing to review day-
care license was a violation of due process because plaintiff not present); Stiner v. Califano,
438 F. Supp. at 796 (W.D. Okla 1977) (federal staffing ratios of day-care centers did not deny
due process rights of operators); Bennett v. Arizona State Bd. of Public Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170,
388 P.2d 166 (1964) (statute which denied day-care license without hearing denied due pro-
cess); Cavanaugh v. State of Colo. Dep't of Social Servs., 644 P.2d 1 (1982) (statute for licens-
ing day-care centers was valid use of legislative powers).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2" This principle had its ori-
gin in Supreme Court cases from the 1920's, which held that parents
had a right to educate their children in schools of their choice and in
subjects they deemed important. 2" In those cases, due process "lib-
erty" was found to mean
[N]ot merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
. . . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home,
and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by freemen.2
Subsequent decisions elaborated on this liberty interest in con-
nection with natural fathers' custody rights,2 8 laws requiring sterili-
zation of criminals,"" use of contraceptives by married couples,250
and compulsory education laws.251 In the latter case, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that:
[T]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents . . . is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.252
The strong language of these decisions, as well as the range of
liberty interests they encompass, support the conclusion that
"parenting, with its concomitant decisions on rearing, care and edu-
cation, is a fundamental right of personal liberty and any infringe-
ment thereof assumes constitutional dimensions. "253
Parental liberty interests do not, however, insulate all decisions
about day-care from state regulation. One state court acknowledged
parenting as a fundamental right, but held that it was "personal in
nature" and could not be delegated to third parties. "When parents
delegate to third parties those decisions regarding child rearing, care,
discipline and education, such delegation does not carry with it the
245. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40) (1974).
246. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
247. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
248. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
249. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
250. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
251. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
252. Id. at 232.
253. Johnson v. California Dep't of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 885, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 53 (1981).
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constitutional protections inherent in the right of the parents. '254
Another court 55 was "not convinced" that the Meyer/Pierce
line of cases " 6 even applied to parents who were challenging day-
care regulations. However, even if one concedes that parental choices
about day care fall within this fundamental right of personal liberty,
it is doubtful whether parents could ever show that state regulatory
measures were unreasonable enough to violate due process.
b. The Arbitrary and Unreasonable Standard
"Arbitrary and unreasonable" has proven to be a difficult stan-
dard for challengers to satisfy. Even if a court finds credible evidence
that a particular requirement is unnecessary and causes hardship,
the requirement may not violate due process. As long as "there is
some showing in the Government's proof to support the administra-
tive judgment," the requirement will probably be held valid. 57 A
district court that evaluated a due process challenge to FIDCR " 8
staffing ratios stated the test as follows:
The regulations must be presumed to be constitutional and may
be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.
(citations omitted) The courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies (citations
omitted) . . . . In conclusion, we cannot say that the staffing
regulation "manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly
lacking in rational justification . . . ." (citations omitted)."'
This language accurately reflects the Supreme Court's current
approach to substantive due process adjudication. " The approach
cloaks legislative and administrative decisions with a presumption of
constitutionality, making it very difficult to show that a substantive
254. Johnson v. California Dep't of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 177 Cal.
Rptr. at 53.
255. Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 802 (1977).
256. See supra text accompanying note 246.
257. Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 802 (1977).
258. See supra text accompanying note 66.
259. Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 802 (W.D. Okla. 1977). The court reached
this conclusion even though it found persuasive evidence that fees would increase dramatically;
parents would no longer be able to afford the day care that they previously used; mothers
would have to stop working and remain at home with children; and existing safety precautions,
and fire evacuation plans "tended to show that the staffing requirements are unnecessary and
unreasonable." Id. at 801.
260. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); McDonald v. Board of Elec-
tion, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 47 (1966); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955).
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requirement is so unreasonable as to violate due process. Moreover,
a close examination of substantive day-care requirements indicates
that most are quite reasonable.
In general, statutory provisions about day-care facilities govern
health and safety requirements, such as staff-child ratios, staff quali-
fications, and square footage requirements for indoor and outdoor
spaces in day-care centers. 61 Most regulatory provisions merely
flesh out the statutory mandates in greater detail. "2
The substantive regulatory provisions are by no means uniform;
state-to-state variations may be quite significant. 263 But the due pro-
cess doctrine does not require uniformity. Only if a particular regu-
lation is "patently arbitrary" or "utterly lacking in rational justifica-
tion, '"264 is it likely to be invalidated on substantive due process
grounds. As long as a credible rationale exists for a particular re-
quirement, it will probably survive a substantive due process
challenge.
In the final analysis, the only substantive due process challenge
that might prevail in the day-care context is one based on the theory
that a regulation conflicts with its statutory mandate, or exceeds the
261. See supra note 206; see also Collins, "Child Care and the States: The Comparative
Licensing Study," YOUNG CHILDREN 3 (July 1983); TDHR Report, supra note 136, at 22-
30.
262. E.g., HAWAII ADMIN. CODE § 17-892-19; 102 CODE OF MASS. REGS. 7.01(14);
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-4-117 (requiring day-care centers to keep records with medical
information, immunization history, and emergency phone numbers; ILL. ADMIN. CODE §
407.20; TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.431; MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 400.5209; 102 CODE OF
MASS. REGS. 7.01(20) (requiring day-care centers to have a specified number of toilets based
on the number of children in the facility; ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 407.21; 102 CODE OF MASS.
REGS. 7.01 (requiring day-care centers to separate infants and toddlers from older children);
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 R. 81075.2; TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.418-420; HAWAII ADMIN.
CODE § 17-892-21; NEW MEXICO ADMIN. CODE § 911-3; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-4-118
(requiring day-care centers to exclude sick children, and isolate those who become sick during
the day from others); ILLS. ADMIN. CODE § 407.22; MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 400.5205;
TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 81.423; HAWAII ADMIN. CODE § 17-892-36 (requiring that food be
refrigerated, or "stored under sanitary and safe conditions;" KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-4-116;
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 407.17-21; MICH. ADMIN. CODE R.400.5106; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, R. 8117.2 (requiring that regular outdoor play be provided).
263. E.g., A recent survey of minimum standards for day-care centers in California,
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas showed that the square footage requirements for indoor space ranged
from 20 to 40 square feet per child; and from 45 to 80 square feet of outdoor space. The same
survey showed a similar range of staff/child ratios: some states required one adult for every
four infants, while others allowed one adult for every eight; and some states required one adult
for every ten four-year-olds, while others required one adult for every twenty. TDHR RE-
PORT, supra note 136, at 24-26.
264. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960), cited in Stiner v. Califano, 438 F.
Supp. 796, 802 (1977).
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scope of that mandate. 26 Generic substantive due process attacks,
such as those invalidating state and federal legislation during the
Lochner era,268 now seem destined to founder on the exacting stan-
dard of arbitrariness and unreasonableness.
This outcome means that agencies will not be pestered by court
challenges every time they issue substantive day-care regulations,
and thereby means that the laudable goal of administrative efficiency
is served. But the outcome also means that burdensome or ill-consid-
ered regulations may be imposed on the day-care community, with
little chance of invalidation on substantive grounds. Providers and
consumers of day care are therefore dependent on the good faith and
sense of public accountability of the regulatory agency or agencies,
and the balance of power rests clearly with the latter.
In light of the situation described above, the requirements of
procedural due process assume greater significance as protective
mechanisms for the day-care community. Regulatory challenges
based upon procedural due process may have a greater likelihood of
success, as will be discussed in the next section.
2. Procedural Due Process Considerations
Legal challenges based on substantive due process would be
aimed at regulatory standards that are issued by legislative or ad-
ministrative bodies. But regulatory efforts encompass much more
than the promulgation of standards. They include numerous proce-
dures, such as:
(a) granting, denying, and revoking permission to operate;
(b) issuing sanctions, short of revocation, against facilities that
violate the standards;
(c) devising rules and substantive standards;
(d) inspecting day-care facilities to verify compliance with those
standards; and
(e) handling consumer (parent) complaints about regulated
facilities.
265. E.g., Atkins v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., 92 Mich. App. 313 (1979) (which
confronted this theory, and held that the regulation was not in conflict with the statute).
266. This epithet takes its name from the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), which overturned a state law establishing a 60-hour work week for bakery employees,
because the law's means did not have a real and substantial relationship to its ends. The case
highlights the "strict and skeptical means-end analysis" used by the Supreme Court from the
early 1900's until 1937, when the landmark decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937) signalled the end of this analytic approach. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERCIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427-55 (1978).
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Like substantive standards, these procedures must be reasonable and
not arbitrary, so that they comport with due process. However, the
criteria for determining arbitrariness tend to be more precise for pro-
cedural provisions than for substantive ones. Therefore, courts seem
more willing to invalidate state regulatory schemes if they have pro-
cedural gaps than if their substantive components are challenged.2 7
a. Procedures for Granting, Denying, or Revoking
Day-Care Licenses
Many state courts have adjudicated cases brought by day-care
providers, challenging the procedures by which they were denied
permission to operate.2 6 An Arizona court outlined the essential
components of such procedures as follows:
Petitioner must be given notice of time and place of hearing, a
reasonable [sic] definite statement of the grounds for denial of
her application, the right to produce witnesses in her own be-
half, the right to examine witnesses who testify against her and
a full consideration and a fair determination according to the
evidence by the body before whom the hearing is had.2 9
Another court added the requirement that "the order denying a li-
cense must set forth in full the facts upon which the decision of the
board was based. ' '2 70 Formal hearings and formal findings are not
essential, nor must a reviewing court always be bound by the find-
ings reached by an administrative tribunal," but the procedure
must nonetheless "conform to recognized standards of fairness and a
record must be made which permits a review of the action of the
267. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537-38 (1978). Professor Tribe
painstakingly traces recent Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate "greater willingness to
overturn legislative decisions on matters of procedure than on questions of substance." While
he ultimately concludes that "the Court must move toward more deference on matters of pro-
cedure or less deference on matters of substance," it is clear that neither the U.S. Supreme
Court, nor the state courts with which this article is primarily concerned, have done so.
268. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Oregon Children's Serv. Division, 563 P.2d 767 (1977);
Mehrer v. Michigan Dep't of Social Serv., 24 Mich. App. 453, 180 N.W.2d 345 (1970);
Cavanaugh v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Serv., 644 P.2d I reh'g den., 460 U.S. 1104 (1983);
Rydd v. Kansas State Bd. of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 451 P.2d 239 (1969); Rupert v. Washing-
ton Dep't Social and Health Serv., 89 Wash. 2d 698, 574 P.2d 1187 (1978).
269. Bennett v. Arizona Bd. of Public Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 173, 388 P.2d 166, 169
(1963).
270. Rydd v. Kansas State Bd. of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 727, 451 P.2d 239, 245 (1969)
(state's denial of family day-care license because of child abuse of applicant's own child vio-
lated due process because no hearing was provided).
271. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539-59 (1978).
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[agency] by a court. ''272
Such "recognized standards" are now codified by many states in
administrative procedure acts (APA's) that bind all agencies per-
forming adjudicative functions. 273 Some day-care regulatory schemes
incorporate by reference the provisions of the state APA.2 74 If an
agency does not satisfy the pertinent act, a court will remand the
matter back to the agency for another hearing.2m
Other regulatory schemes include the details of administrative
hearings and subsequent judicial review, in the text of the day-care
licensing statute.276 Still others statutorily require notice and hearing
but leave the details of the hearing procedure to the rulemaking au-
272. In re Perpente v. Moss, 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944), cited in Rydd, 95
Ariz. 170, 173, 451 P.2d 239, 245 (1969).
273. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102 (West 1982); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 11500 (West
1980); FLA. STAT. § 120.50 (West 1982); LA. REV. STAT. § 46.107 (West 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 183.310-500 (1983); MICH. COMp. LAW ANN. § 24.201 et. seq. (West 1981).
274. E.g. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1551 (West 1979); CoLo. REV. STAT. §
26-6-108(3); FLA. STAT. § 402.310(2) (West 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1407 (West
1982); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.121(4).
275. E.g., Reynolds v. Oregon Children's Servs. Div., 29 Or. App. 381, 563 P.2d 767
(1977) (revocation of day-care license did not satisfy Oregon APA).
276. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §§22-26 (Michie 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-
214(f)(g) and (h) (1981); ALA. CODE § 38-7-9 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-43F
(West 1977). Connecticut has a particularly well-drafted provision:
Any applicant denied a license to operate a child day-care center shall be given
written notice by registered mail by the commissioner of health stating the rea-
sons for such denial. The applicant may, within fifteen days of the date of the
mailing of said notice, make a request in writing by registered mail directed to
the commissioner of health for a hearing on said denial. The commissioner of
health shall notify the applicant in writing within ten days of the receipt of the
request of the place and date of hearing which hearing shall be held not less
than thirty days from the date of mailing of the notice. The hearing may be
conducted by the commissioner or by a hearing officer appointed by the commis-
sioner in writing. The applicant shall be entitled to be represented by counsel
and a transcript of the hearing shall be made. If the hearing is conducted by a
hearing officer, he shall state his findings and make a recommendation to the
commissioner on the issue of denial of the license. The commissioner, based
upon said findings and recommendation of the hearing officer, or after a hearing
conducted by him, shall render a decision in writing denying the application for
the license or granting the license in accordance with the regulations adopted
under sections 19-43b to 19-431, inclusive. A copy of such decision shall be sent
by registered mail to the applicant. An applicant aggrieved by such decision may
appeal to the superior court as provided in section 19-43j.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-43F (West 1977).
Timetables and procedural details are not identical. Most states have 30-day notice provi-
sions, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2760 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 407 (West
1982); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1212 (Bobbs-Merrill 1983). But once an agency decision is
rendered, aggrieved parties in Oklahoma and Idaho have 10 days to appeal to court, while
those in South Carolina get 30 days, and those in Illinois are directed to the state APA for
judicial review of agency decisions. ILL. REV. STAT. § 2227 (1983).
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thority of licensing agency.2 7
Even where regulatory schemes are silent as to the relevant ad-
ministrative procedure, courts rely upon the doctrine of procedural
due process itself to mandate notice and an opportunity for hear-
ing.217  Virtually all states currently regulating day-care make such
provisions. When an agency fails to comply with the appropriate
procedural requirements, it must re-adjudicate the matter.2 7 9
Due process safeguards protect the agency as well as the ag-
grieved parties. Day-care providers who do not avail themselves of
hearing procedures under their state regulatory schemes are in a
poor position to litigate the agency's decision subsequently.280
Because procedural challenges are so time-consuming, many
states have implemented a system of "provisional licensing" that ex-
pedites the process without depriving any party of the safeguards
enumerated above. Under this system, a state agency has discretion
to grant a temporary permit, for six months or longer,2"' to a facility
"that does not meet all standards of the department, if the facility or
applicant is attempting to meet the minimum standards."2 2 Provi-
sional licensing represents a creative approach to problems of delay
that arise when agencies take their due process obligations seriously.
277. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-513 (1983) (The annotation to this provision cross-
references the Montanta Administrative Procedure Act, however, which suggests that the li-
censing agency's hearing rules must conform to it); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 346-22 (1976);
IOwA CODE ANN. § 237A.8 (West 1969).
278. E.g., Rydd v. Kansas State Bd. of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 451 P.2d 239, 245 (1969)
("This result we reach is in harmony with the broad remedial purpose sought by the proposed
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, although neither has application in Kansas.")
279. E.g., Reynolds v. Oregon Children's Serv. Div., 29 Or. App. 381, 563 P.2d 767
(1977) (revocation of day-care license did not satisfy Oregon APA).
280. E.g., Rupert v. Washington Dep't of Soc. & Health Serv., 89 Wash 2d. 698, 574
P.2d 1187 (1978) (providers cannot raise constitutional challenge to agency's inspection au-
thority if they fail to appeal hearing examiner's order that their day-care center by inspected);
Cavanaugh v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Serv., 644 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982) reh'g denied, 460 U.S.
1104 (1983) (civil contempt was appropriate against day-care operator who continued to care
for children after state agency revoked her license; she should have appealed revocation).
281. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-509 (1983) (six months, nonrenewable); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 26-6-104(3) (1973) (six months, renewable up to two years); ALA. CODE § 38-
7-5 (West 1975) (six months); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.309 (West 1973) (one year maximum)
(six months, nonrenewable); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1525.5 (West 1979) (six
months, nonrenewable) GA. REV. STAT. § 99-214(d) (1981) (up to one year); S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 26-6-12 (1984).
282. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-509 (1983). California's statute is more specific than
most; it requires that facilities be in "substantial compliance" with minimum standards, and
that "all applicable fire clearances and criminal record clearances" be completed before a pro-
visional license is issued. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1525.5 (1983).
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b. Procedures for Sanctioning Violators
When a state agency sanctions a licensed facility for being out
of compliance with substantive regulations, a broader range of penal-
ties would be useful.28 The most common sanctions- license revo-
cation, injunctive relief, civil contempt, 84 and criminal liability -in-
volve full-fledged adversary proceedings. 85 Certain intermediate
sanctions, like fines, may also require notice and some type of hear-
ing. Administrative hearings, however, are less costly and time-con-
suming than litigation,286 and can undergo further streamlining
without sacrificing due process guarantees.187 Moreover, other plau-
sible intermediate sanctions may not require notice and a hearing,
particularly if these sanctions can be characterized as within an
agency's "supervising" authority rather than its adjudicative
authority.2
88
283. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
284. Civil contempt against violators of injunctions can trigger due process concerns
above and beyond the usual ones surrounding civil litigation. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Colorado
Dep't of Social Servs., 644 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1982), reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1104 (1983),
wherein the plaintiff day-care operator claimed that since contempt was "criminal in nature,"
she "was entitled to a jury trial and the other due process rights accorded one charged . . .
with a criminal offense." The court rejected this claim, holding that Colorado's code of civil
procedure controlled the contempt proceedings, and finding that "the appellant was accorded
all of the due process protections required in a civil contempt proceeding."
285. Injunctive relief requires litigation pursuant to codes of civil procedure, which may
be why most states regard injunctive actions to be brought by seasoned litigators in the attor-
ney general's office rather than seasoned administrative lawyers in the regulatory agency. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text. Criminal liability for violating day-care regulatory pro-
visions can only by imposed after a trial that satisfies all the provisions of the Bill of Rights
that have been "incorporated" into the 14th Amendment and applied to the states via the due
process clause. These include:
[Tihe fourth amendment rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure
and to exclude from criminal trials evidence illegally seized; the fifth amend-
ment rights to be free of compelled self-incrimination and double jeopardy; the
sixth amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial before a jury, to
• . . confront opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for the purpose of
obtaining favorable witnesses; and the eighth amendment right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishments.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 567-68 (1978) [citations ommitted].
286. TDHR REPORT, supra note 136, at 13-14.
287. Texas' Dep't. of Human Resources is seeking legislation to streamline its adminis-
trative adjudications and reduce costs, while still complying with due process requirements.
Among the legislative proposals are: reducing the size of the appeal board from five members
to three, and altering slightly the timetables for notice and appeal of agency decisions. Tele-
phone interview with TDHR legal counsel Marina Henderson (Dec. 20, 1984).
288. See generally K. C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1900):
The supervising power is the power to achieve regulatory objectives without
formal action. It is a concomitant of, and outgrowth from, and a substitute for
the prosecuting power. In the most effective regulatory agencies, perhaps nine-
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Such measures might include (1) identifying specific types of
complaints that will trigger additional, immediate inspections; (2) is-
suing a press release whenever such complaints are received; (3) no-
tifying all parents whose children are in a facility that is the subject
of such complaints; and (4) performing an immediate inspection of
any facility that is the subject of such a complaint, or making refer-
rals to other agencies that might perform such inspections, like the
fire marshal, building inspector, or child welfare authorities.189
These lesser penalties would not prevent an agency from later
invoking stronger sanctions, nor would they prevent the aggrieved
party from insisting on the full panoply of due process safeguards in
such proceedings. Lesser penalties merely expedite the enforcement
process and obviate the need for more severe sanctions, just as provi-
sional licensing expedites the application process and obviates the
need for outright license denials. 9 Both provisional licensing and a
broader range of sanctions are consistent with the mandate of proce-
dural due process and enhance the efficiency of regulatory agencies
in overseeing day-care.
c. Due Process in Non-Adjudicative Agency Procedures
Agencies must also conduct their non-adjudicative procedures
in accordance with the due process clause. Such procedures include
rulemaking, inspecting regulated facilities, and handling consumer
complaints. The specifics of procedural due process differ from func-
tion to function, but the basic requirement of notice to the affected
parties, and an opportunity for them to be heard, undergirds each
one.
i. Administrative Rulemaking
Administrative law commentator, K.C. Davis, maintains that:
The procedure of administrative rulemaking is . . . one of the
greatest inventions of modern government .... The usual pro-
cedure is that prescribed by the [federal] Administrative Proce-
dure Act, the central feature of which is publishing proposed
tenths or more of the desired results are produced through exertion of the super-
vising power, for enforcement through adjudication is obviously wasteful and
cumbersome as compared with enforcement through supervision.
Id.
289. E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUT-
SHEI.L 109-110 (1981).
290. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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rules and inviting interested parties to make written comments.
Anyone and everyone is allowed to express himself and to call
attention to the impact of various possible policies on his busi-
ness, activity, or interest. The agency's staff sifts and summa-
rizes the presentations and presents its own studies. The proce-
dure is both fair and efficient. Much experience proves that it
usually works beautifully."9 1
This rulemaking procedure should govern day-care regulation.
Many statutes incorporate by reference the rulemaking and "fair
hearing" provisions of their state APA's.292 Other states have chosen
to spell out rulemaking procedures in their day-care regulatory
statutes.
293
In either situation, two things are generally required before
day-care standards can be promulgated: (1) public notice of all pro-
posed standards (and revisions), including "either the express terms
or an informative summary of the proposed action;" and (2) an op-
portunity for interested parties "to present statements, arguments, or
contentions in writing, with or without opportunity to present the
same orally."29 Regulations issued in the absence of such a process
often are subject to invalidation for failure to comply with state
291. K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969).
292. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 1973 § 36-883B (West Supp. 1975-84); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 26-6-106(1); ILL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2217(a) (Smith-Hurd 1984-85); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 245.802 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, § 10 (c) (West
1981).
293. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-1212 (1977), which provides:
The board of health and welfare or its representative shall hold a public hearing
at Boise, Idaho, at which interested agencies may appear and protest any rule or
regulation and subsequent amendments thereto promulgated by the board, pur-
suant to the authority of this act. Notice of hearing, together with a copy of the
proposed rules and regulations shall be sent to all known agencies which would
be affected by any rule or regulation so promulgated within thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing.
Protestants may appear at the hearing and voice objections to the action
proposed to be taken by the board and may introduce evidence and call wit-
nesses in support of such objections. The board or its representatives shall give
consideration to the protests and objections and render a written decision
thereon determining whether the proposed action will apply to all agencies ren-
dering like care and service and will be of substantial benefit to the care and
protection of children expressed in the legislative policy of this act as opposed to
any economic loss and damage to the child which may be sustained by the
protestants. . ..
Id.
Notwithstanding this detail, it would seem more efficient to incorporate a state APA into
the day-care regulatory statute.
294. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 11346-47 (West 1984). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 171-186 (1984).
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APA's.2 95
Public participation can occur at various stages of the rulemak-
ing process. The general aim is to accord interested persons an op-
portunity to participate in rule formulation."' 96 Most "APA" litiga-
tion involves defects in the promulgation phase - when proposed
rules already exist and are being subject to public notice and com-
mentary. But it is in the earlier formulation phase that day-care
regulators are taking the most creative steps to meet their due pro-
cess obligations.
Many statutes regulating day-care actually list the groups and
individuals who must participate with the state agency in formulat-
ing day-care standards.2 97 Even states that only require advice and
assistance from "persons representative of the various types of child
care facilities,"' 2 or "consultation with the department of health, the
department of education, and the fire marshal,"299 still go well be-
yond general APA requirements. 800 Such provisions reinforce a sense
of accountability to the public, and minimize the likelihood of dissen-
sion at the promulgation phase of rulemaking.0 1
295. E.g., Costa v. Sunn, 642 P.2d 530 (Hawaii 1982) (revised family day-care regula-
tions were invalidated because Dep't. of Social Servs. did not comply with state APA in notic-
ing proposed rule changes); see also In re Rules and Regulations, 195 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1963) (single newspaper notice of public hearing on child care regulations, one month in
advance did not comply with Ohio APA, so regulations were struck down).
296. Paulson, supra note 9, at 15 (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 119-8-6 (Supp.
1967)).
297. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 404 (West 1966) (requiring committees of representa-
tives of child-care facilities to prepare standards and regulations, and prohibiting such regula-
tions from being "made, prescribed, or published until after consultation with the Department
of Health and Education, and the State Bureau or Investigation or other agency performing
the duties of State Fire Marshal..."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 28A, § 10(c) (West
1981) (requiring the Office for Children to promulgate rules only after consulting with "the
executive offices of educational affairs, manpower affairs, public safety, communities and de-
velopment, and the departments of youth services, mental health, public health and public
welfare"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.112(2)(1-2) (requiring an ad hoc committee for each
type of regulated child care organization, composed of representatives of the departments of
public health, education, mental health, state police, and fire marshal, as well as parents and
child-care facilities affected by the act); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-883(E) (Supp. 1975-84)
(requiring consultation with "agencies and organizations that are knowledgeable about the
provision of day care services to children" including the department of economic security; de-
partment of education; state fire marshal; league of cities and towns; citizen groups; and day-
care advisory board).
298. I... ANN. STAT. ch. 22, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).; ALA. CODE § 38-7-7 (1975).
299. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 346.20 (1976).
300. Most APA's address the formulation stage by authorizing interested persons to pe-
tition an agency for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
26-6-106 (1982); OHIfo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(A) (Page 1981).
301. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text; see also Paulsen, supra note 9, at
14-15.
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d. Procedures for Inspecting Day-Care Facilities and
Handling Consumer Complaints
One commentator noted that "A licensing law is unenforceable
without authorization for the administrative agency to verify that
minimum standards are met. This requires that the right of entry,
inspection, and investigation be delegated to the agency." S 2 Virtu-
ally all day-care regulatory statutes authorize state agencies to con-
duct inspections both prior to and following the grant of a license.
Some provide for inspections "at any reasonable time." 303 Others
provide for inspection "during the hours of operation."" 4 Many au-
thorize the regulatory agency to inspect "as often as it deems neces-
sary or desirable." ' A few statutes allow inspections "at any
time."30
Most do not allude to any notice requirement, implying instead
that day-care licensees and applicants simply waive any entitlement
to notice as a condition of licensing.30 7 Similarly, most statutes do not
explicitly mention that inspections by licensing representatives may
be conducted in response to complaints,308 but most regulatory agen-
cies presume that they have authority to make such visits.
The ostensible purpose of "supervisory" inspections of day-care
facilities is to insure that they continue to meet minimum regulatory
standards.30 9 Social welfare commentators have traditionally argued
302. LICENSING OF CHILD CARE, supra note 9, at 13.
303. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 418-850(2) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A §
10(d) (West 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 406 (West 1966); ALA. CODE § 38-7-11
(1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-107 (Michie 1983).
304. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.804 (West 1982).
305. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 19, 346-23 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1217
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-6-107 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 237A.4
(West 1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-20-15 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.15.060(1)
(West 1982).
306. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 432A.180 (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-885(A) (West
Supp. 1975-84); NEB. REV. STAT. SUPP. § 71-1903 (1984).
307. Some of the more precisely drafted statutes clearly give authority to inspect "unan-
nounced" or "without prior notice." See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 42.044(b) (Vernon
1980); ALA. CODE § 38-7-11 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-2B-10 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §
14-10-119 (Michie 1980); Kentucky requires that: "all inspections of licensed and unlicensed
day-care centers and homes . . . shall be unannounced." Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.896(8) (1982)
(emphasis added).
308. A few statutes provide separate authority to investigate complaints or alleged viola-
tions. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2870 (Law. Co-op 1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48-74
(West 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-10-120 (Michie 1980). The careful drafting in Texas'
licensing statute, which requires an inspection when a complaint is received, and also
prescribes that notice be given the provider in such circumstances, is the exception and not the
rule. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 42.044(c) (Vernon 1980).
309. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1217 (Bobbs Merrill 1977) (visits are "[flor the
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that broad investigative authority for agencies is justified by their
"supervising powers," which are different from-and less fettered by
due process than-their "prosecuting powers." '81
But regulatory agencies are often acting under both sets of pow-
ers when conducting administrative inspections. They may be seek-
ing to identify facilities that need technical assistance,"' but they
may also find facilities that merit sanctions for noncompliance.
Moreover, when agencies respond to complaints, they are clearly
acting as "law enforcement" entities whose inspections may lead to
adversary proceedings. Not surprisingly, most providers view all ad-
ministrative inspections with suspicion and dread.
One of the key issues confronting day-care regulators is whether
their broad investigative authority is constitutional. 812 The issue in-
volves not only due process concepts, but also Fourth Amendment
doctrine, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "Rea-
sonableness" in the Fourth Amendment context means the need for a
pre-inspection warrant, obtained from a neutral magistrate.313
purpose of determining whether every [facility]. . . consistently maintains conformity with the
standards"); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-6-107(1) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
885 (West Supp. 1975-84).
310. See generally Binder & Class, supra note 205, at 7 ("continuing supervision is a
method of forestalling costly and time-consuming revocation action, and in well-established
agencies it is assumed that supervision is a part of the overall licensing process.") Administra-
tive inspections need not always be preceded by notice. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROc. CODE §§
1822.51, 1822.56 (1985); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (inspections without no-
tice are permissible if an impartial magistrate grants a warrant). And under the federal APA,
agency inspections may sometimes supplant the need for the formal trial-type hearings usually
prescribed by that act. See, e.g., U.S.C.A. § 554(a)(3).
311. Even when statutes emphasize the technical assistance role by authorizing educa-
tion, training, and informal consultation to day-care providers, such services are generally pro-
vided only "on request." E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2890 (Law. Coop. 1983) ("The De-
partment shall offer consultation through employed staff or other qualified persons to assist a
potential applicant, an applicant or registered operator in meeting and maintaining the sug-
gested standards for family day-care homes"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1510 (West
1979) ("The state department may provide consulting services upon request to any community
care facility to assist in the identification or correction of deficiencies and in the upgrading of
the quality of care. ... ); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 42.047 (Vernon 1980) ("The depart-
ment shall offer consultation to potential applicants, applicants, and license and certification
holders .... "); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-513(5) (1983) ("Upon request, the department
shall give consultation to every licensee and registrant who desires to upgrade the services of
his program."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.314 (West 1973) ("The department shall provide
consultation services, technical assistance, and in-service training, when requested and as avail-
able to operators, licensees, and applicants to help improve programs and facilities for child
care . . . . '); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.101 (West Supp. 1984).
312. Prof. Paulsen suggested in 1968 that the "broad investigative powers" of day-care
regulatory agencies might be unconstitutional. Paulsen, The Licensing of Child-Care Facili-
ties-A Look at the Law. 21 ALA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1968).
313. At one time, all administrative inspections were considered exempt from the war-
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Searches may be conducted without warrants when a regulated busi-
ness has specifically consented to the search,3 or when the evidence
gathered by the inspector is in "plain view" from roadways or other
public areas.1
1 5
In addition, warrantless searches have been upheld in a few
closely regulated industries,3"6 but the Supreme Court has made
clear that the range of such industries is extremely narrow.317 Indus-
tries are not "closely regulated" merely because their businesses
must be licensed, nor can an industry be presumed to agree, as part
of the licensing process, to regulatory inspections without notice.
"Closely regulated industries" are the exception and not the rule.
They must have "such a history of government oversight that no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy . . . could exist for a proprietor . . .
[who] has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulations." '8
Despite these stringent criteria, virtually all current day-care
regulatory schemes envision unannounced, warrantless inspections of
day-care facilities. 8 9 Thus far, only California has faced a constitu-
tional challenge to its warrantless searches of day-care facilities, in a
case involving surprise inspections of family day-care homes."' The
federal district court adjudicating this challenge rendered an exhaus-
tive and well-reasoned opinion concluding that family day-care was
not a "pervasively regulated industry." '' However, in a similarly
rant requirement. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (health inspector did not
need warrant to search for rats if authorizing statute requried inspector to identify himself and
conduct inspections during normal business hours). This view was rejected in two 1967 deci-
sions, which required warrants for administrative searches of apartment buildings, Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and commercial warehouses, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S.
541. The Court recognized that inspections are necessary to enforcement of health and sanitary
standards, and that the criminal law concept of probable cause was probably inapplicable to
these administrative searches. Instead, administrative warrants could issue when "reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied," and
these standards would vary according to the nature of different regulatory programs. Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
314. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
315. Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861
(1974) (emissions from smokestack visible from public areas of factory grounds).
316. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (licensed retail
liquor establishment consented to warrantless inspection at time of licensing); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms dealer).
317. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
318. id.
319. See supra notes 310-11.
320. Rush v. Obledo, 517 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in part, 756 F.2d 713
(9th Cir. 1985).
321. Id. The court based its conclusion on a painstaking analysis of pertinent Supreme
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exhaustive opinion, the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the district
court in part, concluding that family day-care is pervasively regu-
lated, and that California's inspection program, "in terms of the cer-
tainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant. '5 22
There are significant areas of agreement in the two decisions.
Both recognize the family day-care provider's strong privacy interest,
the state's vital interest in protecting children, and the
need-dictated by the Fourth Amendment-for reasonable inspec-
tions.12 ' But the Court of Appeals opinion dwells much more on the
concern about child abuse that has heightened in the time since the
district court rendered its decision.324 Such concern, along with great
deference to the state's police power and parens patriae interests ap-
pear to have led the Court of Appeals to seek out an exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
While this litigation will not end the controversy, it may
prompt some states to opt for very broad inspection authority."
However, even the Ninth Circuit did not approve "general searches
at any time of any place providing care and supervision of chil-
dren." '326 Reasonable restrictions on the time and scope of regulatory
Court doctrine, the plethora of lower court cases decided since Barlow's, and the state's as-
serted interest in warrantless inspections.
322. The Court of Appeals found that family day-care homes are "heavily regulated"
and that the family day-care provider "cannot help but be aware that he or she 'will be subject
to effective inspection'(citation)." 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985).
323. See, e.g., Rush v. Obledo, 517 F. Supp. at 912-916; 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985).
324. 756 F.2d 713.
The majority of children receiving care in family day-care homes are under
five years of age and some are as young as six days old. The California Legisla-
ture was plainly aware that such children, away from their parents, need the
special protection of the state and that the interest, health, and safety of children
are of paramount importance in our society. Parents who use day care, espe-
cially low-income parents who must place their children in affordable day care
while they work, must be assured that strict monitoring of health and safety
conditions will keep their children safe.
Recognizing the magnitude of abuses in child day-care facilities are suscep-
tible to easy concealment, such as over-capacity, lack of supervision, accessibility
to poisonous chemicals or firearms, open pools, hazardous stairwells, and sexual
or physical abuse, the Legislature could reasonably determine that a system of
warrantless inspection is necessary in this case.
Id.
325. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-2990 (Law. Co-op 1983), which before amended by
Act 303 (1984), mandated 24-hour notice for all agency visits except in cases involving com-
plaints. The next act removes the notice requirement.
326. Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985):
In determining the sufficiency of this regulation, we note that the regulation
restricts the areas to be searched to those where the children have access, and
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inspections are constitutionally mandated, and any scheme providing
for inspections without warrants or notice to the day-care facility
would seem vulnerable.
Thus, it would be prudent for state legislatures to re-evaluate
the inspection authority they have granted regulatory agencies, and
for the agencies to determine whether their inspection programs are
sufficiently limited and precise. 21 7 Existing statutes may be easily
amended to build in a presumption of notice for all supervisory in-
spections, while retaining-as a last resort-the option of unan-
nounced visits.328 Policymakers will have to decide for themselves
whether to consider day care a "closely regulated industry" or not,
but it would seem a progressive decision to require a pre-inspection
warrant for unannounced inspections. The standards for such ad-
ministrative warrants are not as exacting as those applicable to crim-
inal searches, and could be straightforwardly written into a regula-
tory statute. 29 The spirit of the Fourth Amendment would be well
served by such a legislative decision, as would the policy of distin-
guishing between an agency's technical assistance role and its law
enforcement role.330
limits the hours at which searches may be conducted to those during which
family day care takes place. This statute, as limited by this regulation, is thus
sufficiently precise and restrictive so as to preclude general searches by state
officials.
Id.
327. Whether or not the statute requires notice and/or warrants, agency regulations can
be drafted to require them. The only example of such a regulation encountered by this author
in the course of researching this article was the one at issue in Rush v. Obledo, CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, § 88030.
328. E.g., TEX. HUM. REs. CODE § 42.044(c) (Vernon 1980) which provides, when an
inspection is triggered by a complaint, that: "The division representative must notify the facil-
ity's director or authorized representative . . . and report in writing the results of the investi-
gation to the director of the director's authorized representative." Although this statute does
not incorporate a warrant requirement, it does go farther than most in meeting the constitu-
tional objections that might be leveled by day-care providers.
329. The law is clear that administrative warrants do not require "specific evidence of
an existing violation." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967); See v. Seat-
tle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Receipt of a consumer complaint would probably be sufficient, as
would allegations that a particular facility had declined an agency's notice monitoring visit.
330. A good example of a policy that recognizes these distinctions may be found in the
TDHR REPORT, supra note 136. This report recommended that the licensing program desig-
nate "specialized complaint investigators" who would be separate and distinct from the staff
who assist day-care providers in attaining and maintaining their licenses. The report noted:
There are positives and negatives to having specialized complaint investigators.
The positives include having a person investigating who has had no previous
regular contact with the facility and who can presumably bring a more open
mind to the question of whether there are violations; licensing representatives
who conduct investigative skills; and specialized licensing representatives will
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E. Day-Care Regulation and The Equal Protection Clause
"Police power" entitles state government to regulate day care.
The exercise of police power is limited by the unlawful delegation
doctrine and the constitutional requirements of due process. Another
major limit exists on state government's use of police power to regu-
late day care- the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." Like
the concept of due process, equal protection derives from the United
States Constitution,"3 1 and has an analog in virtually every state con-
stitution. The essence of its guarantee is that legislative and adminis-
trative classifications must be "reasonable,""32 and not "affect two or
more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." 83
Whenever legislatures and agencies act, they use classifications.
Examples of such classifications in day-care regulation include regu-
lating nonsectarian private facilities, while exempting parochial and
public ones; 3 4 distinguishing regulations of family day-care from
center-based care;35 prohibiting corporal punishment in day-care fa-
cilities but not in schools; 3 . and exempting church-based day care
from licensing requirements.
Equal protection doctrine does not forbid these classifications
and distinctions, but it does require that they be rationally related to
some legitimate state purpose. 3 7 This standard, against which most
establish better rapport and communication with their counterparts in protective
services ....
id.
The ultimate conclusion, however, was that separating the "complaint investigators" from
the other licensing workers led to a fairer and more efficient process.
331. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1: "No State shall ...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
332. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (1978).
333. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530, 601 P.2d 549, 533, 159 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320(1979); See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 934, 569 P.2d 1286, 1294, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 306
(1977); Johnson v. Department of Social Servs., 123 Cal. 3d 878, 883-84, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49,
52 (1981).
334. E.g., Milwaukee Montessori School v. Percy, 473 F. Supp. 1358 (E. D. Wis.
1979) (no rational basis for distinguishing between private nonsectarian day care provides and
private sectarian ones); see also Ivy League School, Inc. v. Department of Institutions and
Agencies of N.J., 155 N.J. Super. 56, 38 A.2d 381 (1977) (apparent exemption of public and
church-based day-care facilities-which would have violated equal protection- was mislead-
ing because in fact all facilities had to abide by the regulation in question).
335. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 28A, 359-10 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 8305 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-1 (1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.805 (1981); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1980).
336. E.g., Johnson v. Department of Soc. Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 177 Cal. Rptr.
49 (1981).
337. "A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
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day-care classifications will be measured, is called the minimum
scrutiny or "rational relation" standard of equal protection re-
view. 38 It is a "loose" standard because courts presume that the
challenged classification satisfies equal protection, and will only in-
validate the classification upon a showing of arbitrariness similar to
what is required for substantive due process violations. 39
While there are some classifications that trigger more exacting
judicial scrutiny, they do not tend to arise in day-care regulatory
schemes. Classifications based on race or alienage, for example, have
come to be viewed as "suspect." 40 Legislative or regulatory provi-
sions using "suspect classifications" are subject to the "strict stan-
dard" of equal protection review rather than minimum scrutiny.
Under the strict standard of review, classifications must serve a com-
pelling governmental interest that cannot be achieved by any other
means; if they fail to meet this test, the classifications are invalid
under the equal protection clause.34'
The same strict standard of review applies when classifications
affect certain "fundamental interests," such as the right to vote,342
and the right to travel interstate.343 An intermediate standard of re-
view applies to gender-based classifications, " but again, these are
unlikely in the context of day-care regulatory schemes.
The only day-care classifications likely to trigger strict scrutiny
are those exempting church-based day-care programs from regula-
tion. Such exemptions reflect state deference to the First Amendment
right of free exercise of religion. Because this right involves a "fun-
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike .. " Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 235 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); see also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
338. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82B HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1077-87 (1969); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 290-91.
340. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
341. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
342. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1963); see also Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 338, at 1120.
343. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
344. E.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1397-98 (1984) (quoting Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982):
A party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must show an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' . . . . The bur-
den is met only by showing at least that the classification serves important gov-
ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives.
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damental interest," the strict standard of equal protection review ap-
plies. Some courts have recently invalidated religious exemptions on
equal protection grounds."4 5
Conceivably, parents might argue that the right to raise chil-
dren as one sees fit is a "fundamental interest" for equal protection
purposes, just as it is a fundamental right of personal liberty for due
process purposes." Using such a theory, parents could attempt to
challenge, on equal protection grounds, almost any day-care classifi-
cation with which they disagree, and insist that the court subject the
classification to the strict scrutiny test.
However, this approach would probably be rejected by the fed-
eral courts, which have resisted efforts to extend the fundamental
interest concept to housing, 47 education, 48 and welfare. 49 More-
over, while some state courts have moved beyond federal constitu-
tional doctrine in construing their state equal protection clauses,"'0
most would not welcome an obligation to use strict scrutiny every
time a dissatisfied parent challenged a day-care regulation.35' Some
allegation of invidious discrimination or First Amendment considera-
tions would probably be required before state or federal courts sub-
ject day-care regulations to strict scrutiny.
Indeed, aside from litigation about religious exemptions, the
loose standard of equal protection review has been the tool for evalu-
ating day-care regulatory schemes, and most classifications have ac-
cordingly survived. In California, for example, an appellate court re-
jected an equal protection challenge to corporal punishment rules
which treated day-care facilities differently from schools. The court
345. See supra note 146. In states that have deliberately chosen not to grant a religious
exemption, the licensing schemes are also being challenged for violating the first amendment.
These challenges have been uniformly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Roloff Evangelistic
Enterprises v. Texas, 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Ct. Civ. Apps., 1977); State of Texas v. Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. S.Ct. 1984); Kansas v. Heart Minis-
tries, Inc., 607 P.2d 1102 (S.Ct. Kan. 1980); c.f. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc.
v. Texas Dep't Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 246-47.
347. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
348. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
349. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 100-01 (1978).
350. See generally Symposium Issue on State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV.
(June 1985).
351. Courts would probably elevate parens patriae and the police power to the stature
of "compelling state interests," in order to uphold the state regulation. The result would be
similar to the judicial treatment of substantive due process claims based upon parental child-
rearing rights. See supra notes 235-37.
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held that "the two groups are not 'similarly situated' " 3 -a conclu-
sion that will apply to many groups in the day-care community.
Valid distinctions exist between family day-care facilities and
day-care centers. The same is true as between proprietary day-care
facilities and programs operated by the public schools; and govern-
ment-subsidized care and all other day-care programs, whether pro-
prietary or nonprofit. As long as regulators can articulate rational
bases for distinguishing among various types of facilities, it is reason-
able to conclude that the groups are not similarly situated. Thus,
regulatory efforts distinguishing the regulation of day care from
other community care facilities (and/or schools), as urged in Section
III, supra, present no equal protection problems. Nor do regulatory
approaches distinguishing family day-care from center-based care.
However, distinguishing proprietaries from nonprofit day-care
facilities may be vulnerable under the equal protection clause. 5"
Two courts have adjudicated equal protection challenges to statutes
with similar classifications. Both found constitutional flaws, even
under the minimum scrutiny standard of review." ' In Milwaukee
Montessori School v. Percy,3 5' a private school challenged Wiscon-
sin's exemption of public and parochial day-care facilities from li-
censing requirements. In striking down this exemption, the federal
district court noted that the overall objective of licensing "is the pro-
tection of the health and welfare of children cared for in a day-care
setting. There is no apparent reason, however, for distinguishing pri-
vate nonsectarian from private sectarian schools in terms of the care
given by them to the children." '56
While it might be possible to draft regulatory provisions that
permissibly distinguish between profitmaking and nonprofit facili-
352. Johnson v. Department of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d.878, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1981), citing In re Eric J. 25 Cal. 3d 522 (1979); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921 (1977).
While this conclusion technically ended the court's equal protection analysis, the opinion went
on to address the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims in terms that appeared to equate
equal protection and due process doctrines. The ultimate ruling made clear that there was
nothing arbitrary about prohibiting corporal punishment in day care, and that the state had a
rational purpose for such a regulation. Id.
353. See supra note 2.
354. E.g., Milwaukee Montessori School v. Percy, 473 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis.
1979); Yellow Duck Nursery, Inc. and Ivy League School, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Institutions
and Agencies of N.J., 155 N.J. Super. 56, 61-62, 382 A.2d 381, 384 (1977).
355. 473 F. Supp. at 1359.
356. In Yellow Duck Nursery the New Jersey court wrote similar words about a compa-
rable exemption, although it found no equal protection violation because in practice, the ex-
emption facilities were subject to identical regulation. 155 N.J. Super. 56, 382 A.2d 381
(1977).
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ties, 67 the words quoted above would seem to apply with equal force
to most such provisions. The main criterion on which proprietaries
and nonprofits are not similarly situated is a financial one- the for-
mer seek to make money from their day-care operations. While this
fact may be relevant to the Internal Revenue Service and corporate
boards of directors, it has no legal bearing on the health and safety
mandate of day-care regulators.
Thus, policymakers faced with pressure to distinguish between
proprietary and nonprofit day-care centers have a strong constitu-
tional basis for resisting. Under the equal protection clause, the two
types of facilities are probably "similarly situated." Even with volu-
minous factual support and creative legal argument, such a regula-
tory distinction seems destined for equal protection litigation and
invalidation.
However, aside from proprietary/nonprofit distinctions, and re-
ligious exemptions, the equal protection clause is unlikely to hinder
many day-care regulatory choices. The doctrine is useful primarily
as a safeguard against patently arbitrary classifications. If legislative
and agency officials understand' the doctrine, it can enhance their
regulatory drafting and eliminate the possibility of subsequent con-
stitutional challenges in court.
V. CONCLUSION
This article concurs with the federal Department of Health and
Human Services' statement that "no single set of standards can be
applied practically to all the unique child-care situations found
among the states."' 8 Nevertheless, it remains important for every
state to look closely at its existing approach to day-care regulation,
and to consider revisions that might enhance efficiency as well as
accountability to day-care consumers and providers.
This article has attempted to provide regulatory officials and
members of the day-care community with a better understanding of
current regulatory issues by canvassing the history of day-care regu-
lation (Section II). The article also examined the array of policy
questions currently being urged upon regulatory officials (Section
357. The federal court in Milwaukee Montessori Schools v. Percy noted, in dicta that
the classification "makes no reference to profit as opposed to non-profit institutions," even
though the state argued that this distinction was at the heart of its classification. 473 F. Supp.
at 1359-60.
358. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MODEL CHILD CARE STANDARDS
ACT-A GUIDANCE TO STATES TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE IN DAY CARE FACILITIES 3
(January 1985).
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III). Finally, the article also explored at some length the fundamen-
tal doctrines of administrative and constitutional law that govern reg-
ulatory officials (Section IV).
While no attempt was made to propose a single solution to any
of the regulatory issues, existing statutes and regulations that ad-
dressed them in a salutary fashion were extensively cited. Moreover,
every effort was made to clarify the source-and import-of the le-
gal rights and responsibilities of both the regulators and the day-care
community. Readers should at least comprehend the need for pre-
cisely drawn and rational regulatory provisions; clear and efficient
delegation of regulatory authority to state and local agencies; and
procedures that incorporate fairness and notice to all concerned par-
ties. The forum is now open for others to propose specific solutions.
